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Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise
of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial
JEAN R. STERNLIGHT
Ask any reasonable man on the street, i.e.[,] a consumer, if he thinks it is
fair that he is barred from access to the courts when he has a claim based on
a form contract which contains an arbitration clause and he will respond
with *a resounding "No!" .. .. The reality that the average consumer
frequently loses his/her constitutional rights and right of access to the court
when he/she buys a car, household appliance, insurance policy, receives
medical attention or gets a job rises as a putrid odor which is overwhelming
the body politic.1
I. INTR ODUCTION
When the Supreme Court decided Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.,2 ten years ago, it unleashed a torrent that should have focused
substantial attention on when enforcement of arbitration agreements may
violate the Seventh Amendment jury trial right. Prior to Gilmer, arbitration
was used primarily in contracts involving two knowledgeable sophisticated
parties, in which Seventh Amendment jury trial challenges are less likely to
succeed. However, after Gilmer made it clear that' mandatory arbitration
could be imposed on employees, 3 and therefore presumably also consumers
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I In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999).
2 Gilmer v. Inerstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
3 See also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302, 1311 (2001) (holding
that only employment contracts of transportation workers are excluded from coverage of
FAA). As a matter of semantics, some defenders of Gilmer and its progeny may argue
that it is not correct to say that any contractual arbitration clause is either "mandatory" or
"imposed." Rather, they might assert that while the company initially drafted the clause,
the "little guy" accepted it, making the clause "voluntary." However, as a matter of
practical reality, it is a fact that the companies draft the clauses and then use
nonnegotiable form contracts to ensure that they are applied to consumers and others.
Also, it is simply not true that such clauses are genuinely accepted, knowingly, by
consumers or employees. Rather, consumers rarely read much less understand such form
contracts. See generally David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big
Business: Employee and Consumer Right Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration,
1997 Wis. L. REv. 33, 56-58; Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:
Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q.
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and other "little guys," companies increasingly began to use form contracts to
impose arbitration in these adhesive contexts on a far more frequent basis.4
This phenomenon should have raised the question of whether the adhesive
use of binding arbitration unknowingly and involuntarily deprives such "little
guys" of their Seventh Amendment jury trial rights.
However, the unfortunate fact is that courts, legislators, policymakers,
and the public have paid very little attention to the direct tension between
mandatory binding arbitration and the right to a jury trial. When a company
uses a form contract to require consumers, employees, borrowers, credit card
holders, patients, or other persons to submit claims to binding arbitration,
rather than file them in court, the company deprives the individuals of any
right they may have had to a jury trial. Everyone agrees that no jury trial is
available in arbitration. Nonetheless, relatively few challenges have been
made to mandatory arbitration on this ground. When made, such challenges
have on rare occasion succeeded. 5 However, too often they have been
shrugged off by the courts without sufficient analysis. 6
637, 675-77 (1996) (arguing that "genuine" freedom of contract arguments cannot be
used to justify "imposing binding arbitration through contracts of adhesion on unwitting
consumers.")
4 See Allstar Homes, Inc. v. Waters, 711 So. 2d 924, 933 (1997) (Cook, J.
concurring) ("The reality is that contracts containing [arbitration] provisions appear with
increasing frequency in today's marketplace. As a result, consumers find it increasingly
difficult to acquire basic goods and services without forfeiting their rights to try before a
jury the common-law claims that may accrue to them."). See also Richard C. Reuben,
Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public
Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1031 (2000) (noting increasing proliferation of
mandatory arbitration in contracts of adhesion imposed in banking, securities, health care,
real estate, employment, and consumer sales contexts).
5 See infra text accompanying notes 190-98. Note that the Supreme Court
subsequently endorsed the use of mandatory arbitration in the consumer context in two
cases: Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (holding that the consumer
failed to present evidence that arbitration was too costly to be an adequate forum); and
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (holding Alabama statute
precluding enforcement of predispute arbitration agreement was preempted in case
involving a contract for termite extermination services).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 199-68. It is not at all clear why this subject
has been so neglected. As will be seen, numerous cases discuss the propriety of
contractual jury trial waivers. Yet few courts have applied this same analysis to
arbitration clauses, even though they also accomplish a jury trial waiver, and even though
no good reason has ever been given for not treating arbitration clauses as jury trial
waivers. Perhaps this neglect can be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that one
significant use of arbitration has been in the collective bargaining context, where
arbitration takes the place of the strike, rather than a jury trial. See United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
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Yet once one directly confronts the tension between mandatory arbitration
and the jury trial right, one sees that it must be taken seriously. While the right
to a jury trial available under the U.S. Constitution will not eliminate all
mandatory binding arbitration, when applicable the Seventh Amendment
should limit companies' ability to impose binding arbitration. The Seventh
Amendment will prove particularly important in those cases in which
companies draft clauses that are not clear and conspicuous and attempt to
impose them on persons who are lacking in knowledge and sophistication.
While jury trial rights may also be afforded by federal statutes7 and by state
constitutions or statutes, 8 these rights raise distinct issues. This Article will
focus only on the federal constitutional right to a jury trial.
The federal Constitutional right to a jury trial has long been deemed one
of the fundamental elements of our system of justice. The Seventh
Amendment, ratified in 1791, provides that "[i]n Suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right to jury trial shall
be preserved .... ."9 The Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that "[tihe
7 Juries are, for example, afforded by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1072 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). and by the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat.
192 (1978). In addition, courts sometimes interpret federal statutes that are not explicit to
provide for a right to jury trial. For example, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
language of the antitrust laws to provide for a jury trial. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959). Jury trial rights that are created by federal statute,
rather than the Constitution, raise issues outside the scope of this paper. First, the
standard for waiver of such federal rights may be different than the standard for waiving
the Seventh Amendment jury trial right. Second, because one federal statute does not
clearly "trump" another, as the Constitution defeats inconsistent federal statutes, it would
be necessary to reconcile any federal statutory provisions of jury trial rights with the
possibly contrary Federal Arbitration Act.
8 All fifty states provide for preservation of the jury trial right, in certain kinds of
cases, either by constitution or by statute. Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III,
and the Seventh Amendment, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1037, 1040 n.ll (1999). While some may
argue, citing such cases as Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996),
that state constitutional or statutory jury trial provisions are preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (FAA), I believe this argument
is erroneous. As set out in Casarotto, the FAA preempts those state provisions that are
"applicable only to arbitration provisions." Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 1656. That is, states
may not target arbitration clauses and hold them to higher contractual standards than
other types of provisions. However, state constitutions and laws that protect the jury trial
right are applicable broadly, and not merely to arbitration contracts. Thus, I believe that
where a state provision, for example, requires that any waiver of a jury trial right be
"knowing, voluntary, and intelligent," this standard applies to arbitration clauses just as it
applies to other contracts. A more complete explication of this argument will not be
attempted here.
9 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
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trial by jury is justly dear to the American people. It has always been an
object of deep interest and solicitude, and every encroachment upon it has
been watched with great jealousy." 10 The jury trial is valued for its emphasis
on common sense,11 its empowerment of the common person, 12 and serving as
a check upon the power of the sovereign 13 and the judge.14
Admittedly, the Seventh Amendment does not apply to all litigation
brought in the United States. 15 While it is well established that the Seventh
Amendment applies to actions brought in federal court, 16 it apparently does
not apply in state court,17 and it only applies to cases brought "at common
law" for more than twenty dollars. 18 To determine whether a particular suit
is "at common law," courts must first perform a historical analysis to decide
10 Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 581
(1990) (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) (Story, J.)). See
also Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) ("Maintenance of the jury as a
factfinding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and
jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be
scrutinized with the utmost care.").
11 See I WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 348-50 (7th ed.
1956).
12 See Sward, supra note 8, at 1059-61 (discussing ways in which juries foster
values of political participation and deliberation).
13 Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a
Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1035 (1992).
14 Sward, supra note 8, at 1057-59 (pointing out that the jury is designed to be
independent of not only the legislature but also the judiciary). For additional background
on the Seventh Amendment, see generally Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the
Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REv. 289 (1966); Charles W. Wolfram, The
Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973).
15 It should be emphasized, however, that state constitutional and statutory rights to
a jury trial apply in some of the cases as to which the federal right is not relevant. See
supra notes 7 & 8.
16 Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (holding federal court sitting in
diversity action must apply federal law to determine whether action is "legal" or
"equitable" for purposes of right to jury trial).
17 The Seventh Amendment is one of the very few provisions of the Bill of Rights
that has not been "incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and
thus applied to all of the states. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S.
211, 217 (1916) (stating that Seventh Amendment only applies to proceedings brought in
federal court). See also Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025, 1048 (E.D. La. 1972)
(stating, in three judge district court opinion by Judge Wisdom, that Seventh Amendment
was not to be applied to state courts), affd sub nom. Mayes v. Ellis, 409 U.S. 943 (1972),
affd sub nom. Davis v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1098 (1972). See generally Richard C. Reuben,
ADR and the Troubling Seventh Amendment: A Modern Case for Incorporation (2000)
(manuscript on file with author).
18 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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whether the claim would have entitled parties to a jury trial in Eighteenth-
Century England.' 9 If that historical analysis proves indeterminate, the court
is to examine the nature of the remedy that has been sought and provide a
jury where the relief sought is "legal" as opposed to "equitable. '" 20 It is clear
that some statutory -claims can be deemed to be claims "at common law,"
even though the particular statute did not exist in Eighteenth Century
England.21
While jury trial rights under the Seventh Amendment are admittedly
subject to waiver, waiver is tightly constrained by the following principles:
(1) jury trial waivers may not be lightly implied; (2) courts look at a whole
host of factors to determine whether the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and
intentional; (3) many courts provide that the party seeking waiver bears the
burden of proof; (4) courts' holdings render suspect the use of unsigned or
uninitialed documents to support the finding of a jury trial waiver; (5) in
interpreting purported jury trial waivers, courts have stated that they must be
narrowly construed. 22 These waiver principles apply in cases between two
private parties, and, thus, no "state action" must be -proven to show a
violation of jury trial rights.23
How can the body of law which protects the federal constitutional jury
trial right be reconciled with a body of arbitration law which often states such
propositions as (1) arbitration is favored; (2) arbitration clauses may be
upheld absent a showing of voluntary, knowing, or intentional consent; (3)
the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proof; (4) arbitration can
19 Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,417-21 (1987).
20 Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 563
(1990) (holding plaintiff was entitled to jury trial in statutory "duty of fair representation"
action against union and employer, because while historical analysis was indeterminate,
back pay remedy sought was essentially legal). See also Tull, 481 U.S. at 422-25 (holding
party being sued by government under federal Clean Water Act entitled to jury trial
because civil penalty of sort provided by Act was traditionally available only in court of
law); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-96 (1974) (holding party entitled to jury trial
where claim was brought under federal fair housing statute because relief sought, actual
and punitive damages, was traditionally provided by courts of law).
21 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 348 (1998) (stating
Seventh Amendment applies not only to common law causes of action in existence in
Eighteenth Century, "but also to 'actions brought to enforce statutory rights that are
analogous to common-law causes of action .... "') (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989)). See also cases cited supra note 20.
2 2 See infra text accompanying notes 102-08.
23 The Seventh Amendment on its face does not require state action, and virtually all
of the cases discussed in Section II arise between two or more private entities.
Nonetheless, at least one court has mistakenly held that state action must be proven to
show a violation of the Seventh Amendment. Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers,
191 F.3d 198, 206 (2d Cir. 1999).
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sometimes be imposed using unsigned envelope "stuffers," handbooks, and
warranties; and (5) ambiguous contracts should be construed broadly to
support arbitration?24 Specifically, how can the body of law which protects
the constitutional jury trial right be reconciled with arbitration decisions
approving clauses contained in hidden fine print, imposed on persons not
required to sign or even initial the clause, and particularly when the persons
upon whom the clauses are imposed may be uneducated and sorely lacking
in bargaining power?
To facilitate the comparison between these two bodies of law, I provide a
chart:
Comparison of Courts' Treatment of Contractual Jury Trial
Waivers and Arbitration Clauses
Jury Trial Waivers
1. Waivers of jury trial rights may not be
lightly implied.
2. Jury trial waivers are acceptable only
when they are knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent, after considering such factors
as the negotiability of the waiver and
whether it was actually negotiated, the
conspicuousness of the waiver, any
disparity in bargaining power between
the parties, and the business or
professional experience of the party
opposing the waiver.
Arbitration Agreements
1. Arbitration is favored.
2. Most courts have held arbitration
clauses are valid even when they are not
knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. To
be valid, most courts state arbitration
clauses need not be negotiable, actually
negotiated, or conspicuous. Nor is a
substantial disparity of bargaining power
or expertise usually sufficient to void an
arbitration clause.
3. Many courts have held that the party 3. Courts have generally held that the
seeking to enforce a jury trial waiver party opposing an arbitration clause
bears the burden of proof. bears the burden of proof.
4. Unsigned and uninitialled waivers are 4. Courts have sometimes upheld
suspect. arbitration clauses contained in
unsigned, uninitialled envelope stuffers,
employment handbooks, or warranties.
5. Courts hold that jury trial waivers 5. Courts have often held that ambiguous
must be narrowly construed, in light of arbitration clauses must be interpreted
the presumption against waiver of broadly to favor arbitration.
constitutional rights.
Most courts have not directly confronted the tension between the cases
governing jury trial waivers and those governing arbitration clauses. While the
U.S. Supreme Court has generally expressed great enthusiasm for binding
24 See infra text accompanying notes 186-87.
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arbitration, it has never considered the argument that at least in some contexts,
mandatory binding arbitration may violate the right to a jury trial. For
example, although the Supreme Court's decision, in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.25 held that a securities broker could compel its
employees to arbitrate claims brought under the federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), and although sending the case to arbitration at
minimum deprived the plaintiff of the statutory jury trial to which he would
have been entitled under the ADEA, 26 the Court did not address whether
mandatory binding arbitration might under some circumstances deprive
persons of their Seventh Amendment jury trial right. This lapse is
understandable, in that the argument was not presented by plaintiff either in
the lower courts or before the Supreme Court.27 Moreover, it is not clear
whether or not Mr. Gilmer had a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial,
although it is true that the ADEA statutorily provided him with a jury trial.28
Lower courts' discussions of how jury trial rights can be reconciled with
mandatory binding arbitration have been quite puzzling, inconsistent, and
even frustrating. Most have entirely ignored the issue, likely in large part
because it was not presented to them. A few courts have recognized that a
25 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
26 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (amending statute, in 1978, to add jury trial right). See
also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978) (holding that that there was a statutory
right to a jury trial under the ADEA, even prior to addition of explicit right in § 626(c),
but failing to address whether the Seventh Amendment would also require that a jury trial
be available for claims brought under the ADEA).
27 Plaintiffs counsel did mention, both in his brief and at oral argument, that
plaintiff would have had a statutory entitlement to a jury trial of his ADEA claim, absent
arbitration. Petitioner's Brief, Gilmer (No. 90-18); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., No. 90-18, Oral Argument Transcript, 1991 WL 636282, at *16 (Jan. 14, 1991).
However, counsel did not attempt to make an argument to the Supreme Court under the
Constitution that the waiver was impermissible. This was probably wise, given that the
Fourth Circuit earlier noted that Petitioner "has never asserted that his waiver [of the
judicial forum] was anything other than knowing and voluntary ... " Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 200 (4th Cir. 1990).
28 Although the Supreme Court in Lorillard held that the plaintiff had a statutory
right to a jury trial for claims brought under the ADEA, it did not address the question of
whether plaintiff also had a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial for such a claim.
434 U.S. at 577. It noted a split in the circuits regarding the availability of a jury trial,
under the Seventh Amendment, for ADEA claims. Compare Morelock v. NCR Corp.,
546 F.2d 682, 689 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that because relief sought under ADEA was
essentially equitable, Seventh Amendment jury trial right was not available) with Rogers
v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 838-39 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding suit under
ADEA for damages consisting of back wages gave rise to jury trial right under Seventh
Amendment), and Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950, 953 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that
remedies sought under ADEA were equivalent to traditional legal remedies and thus gave
rise to jury trial right under Seventh Amendment).
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contract to arbitrate waives the jury trial right but have not then explained
their failure to apply the traditional jury trial waiver criteria to determine
whether or not a waiver should be found.29 Some have simply stated that
arbitration is "favored" under federal law while failing to address the possible
invalidity of a federal law that is inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution.30 A
few courts have offered a most unsatisfying analysis that asserts that, by
"agreeing" to arbitrate, persons agree to have their dispute resolved in a non-
Seventh Amendment forum, and that the court therefore need not apply
normal waiver criteria. 31 In contrast, a very small number of courts have
drawn on jury trial concerns to void arbitration clauses.32 Finally, one court
suggested that the tension between the two standards could be resolved by
making it easier to enforce contractual waivers of jury trial rights.33
This Article will address the failure of most courts, attorneys, and
commentators to recognize that the Seventh Amendment jury trial waiver
standard is applicable in many arbitration cases. Part II will describe the strict
analysis courts normally use to determine the validity of contractual jury trial
waivers. Part HI will then show that courts are not using this strict analysis
when they decide arbitration cases, and that they are instead upholding many
arbitration clauses that would likely be void under the Seventh Amendment
test. Part V will examine how courts reconcile these two sets of doctrines
and will argue that there is no defensible rationale for sidestepping or
ignoring the traditional Seventh Amendment analysis in those cases that
could have been brought in federal court at common law. Finally, Part IV
spells out the implications of this analysis for mandatory arbitration. It
urges that when a person states a claim to which the Seventh Amendment is
applicable, courts must apply the traditional jury trial waiver analysis. Under
this analysis courts must refuse to enforce those arbitration clauses that are
not accepted voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
29 See infra text accompanying notes 199-207.
30 See infra text accompanying notes 199-207, 213-23.
31 See infra text accompanying notes 224-68.
32 See infra text accompanying notes 190-98.
33 See infra text accompanying note 209.
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II. THE ANALYSIS TRADITIONALLY EMPLOYED TO DETERmINE THE
VALIDITY OF CONTRACTUAL WAIVERS OF JURY TRIAL RIGHTS UNDER
THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
A. Because the Right to Jury Trial is Fundamental, Courts Will
Indulge Every Reasonable Presumption Against Waiver
It is well recognized that many constitutional rights, including the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial, are waivable. However, the Supreme Court
has frequently enunciated that a presumption'exists against such waivers. In
Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy34 the Court stated, "as the right of jury trial is
fundamental, courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver."
35
Although Aetna involved a directed verdict rather than a contractual jury
trial waiver, it is clear that the presumption against waiver is applicable in the
contractual context as well. For example, the Supreme Court, in Fuentes v.
Shevin,36 relied on the Aetna language in stating that contractual waivers of
due process rights to notice and a hearing may not be lightly inferred. 37 In
case after case, federal courts considering purported contractual waivers have
explicitly stated both that the jury trial right is "fundamental,"38 and that the
presumption against the waiver of the jury trial right must be considered in
interpreting contractual waivers. 39
34 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389 (1937).
35 Id. at 393-94 (holding party did not waive right to have jury resolve factual issues
by requesting directed verdict). See also Dimick v. Schiedt,'293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)
(stating "any seeming curtailment of a right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with
utmost care").
36 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
37 Id. at 94 n.31.
38 E.g., Natl Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977); Oei
v. Citibank, N.A., 957 F. Supp. 492, 523 (S.D.N.Y 1997); Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank,
N.A., 920 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D.P.R. 1996); Coop. Fin. Assoc. Inc. v. Garst, 871 F. Supp.
1168, 1169 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 826 F. Supp. 57, 59
(D.R.I. 1993).
39 E.g., Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258 ("It is elementary that the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury is fundamental and .. .a presumption exists against its waiver.");
Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. Sevaux, 866 F. Supp. 1102, 1105 (N.D.111. 1994) (quoting Aetna
Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937), for proposition that "as the right of jury
trial is fundamental, courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against vaiver");
Heller Fin., Inc. v. Finch-Bayless Equip. Co., No. 90 C 1672, 1990 WL 77500, *1 (N.D.
Ill. May 31, 1990) ("The right to a jury trial is fundamental'and courts will indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver."); Bonfield v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 717
F. Supp. 589, 594-96 (N.D. I1. 1989) (quoting Aetna, stating that "as the right of jury
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B. Contractual Waivers of Jury Trial Rights are Permissible Only
When the Waiver is Knowing, Voluntary, and Intentional
While the Supreme Court has never enunciated the precise standard courts
should employ in reviewing contractual jury trial waivers, 40 lower courts have
virtually uniformly held that such waivers are only valid when they meet a
high standard variously expressed in words such as knowing, voluntary, and
intentional. For example, in the leading case of National Equipment Rental,
Ltd. v. Hendrix,41 the Second Circuit stated, "it is elementary that the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial is fundamental and that its protection can only
be relinquished knowingly and intentionally."42 Other federal courts have
upheld contractual waivers only where they were "knowing and intentional," 43
trial is fundamental, courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver," but
still upholding contractual waiver given factual context).
40 The Supreme Court has consistently employed the "knowing, voluntary,
intentional standard" for waivers of constitutional rights in the criminal context. E.g.,
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (stating, in case involving purported
waiver of right to trial due to guilty plea, that "[w]aivers of constitutional rights not only
must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences"). However, the Court has left open
the possibility that waiver standards might be somewhat different in the criminal and civil
contexts. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-87 (1972) (holding that
even assuming a "voluntary, knowing, intelligent" test applied, contractor had waived its
due process rights to notice and a hearing). See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95
(1972) (stating that regardless of what waiver standard applies in civil context, it was not
met, in that "[w]e need not concern ourselves with the involuntariness or unintelligence
of a waiver when the contractual language relied upon does not, on its face, even amount
to a waiver.") In both Fuentes and Overmyer the Court did, however, emphasize the
relevance of such factors as clarity and conspicuousness of the waiver, disparity in
bargaining power, the process of negotiation, and the fairness of the bargain. For a more
detailed discussion of Overmyer and Fuentes see Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the
Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh
Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L.
Rav. 1, 50-63 (1997). See also Reuben, supra note 4, at 1020-30.
41 Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977).
42 Id. at 258 (holding that lessee did not waive trial by jury where waiver provision
in contract was "set deeply and inconspicuously" in the agreement, and where lessee "did
not have any choice but to accept the.., contract as written if he was to get badly needed
funds").
43 E.g., Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1988)
(citing, favorably, standard that permits waiver of fundamental jury trial right that is
knowing and intentional, while going on to uphold waiver in commercial loan); Leasing
Serv. Corp v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating, in upholding waiver in
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"knowing, voluntary and intentional," 44  "knowing, voluntary and
intelligent, ''45 "voluntary and intentional," 46 "knowing and intentional," 47
"knowing and intelligent,"48 or "knowing and voluntary."49 The courts have
not drawn any distinctions based on the slight differences in the wording of
these phrases.50
commercial lease, that the "[S]eventh [A]mendment right is of course a fundamental one,
but it is one that can be knowingly and intentionally waived by contract").
44 E.g., Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D. Col.
1982) (rejecting waiver in franchise agreement and stating "defendants have a very heavy
burden of proving that the plaintiffs knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally agreed upon
the jury waiver provisions .... A constitutional guarantee so fundamental as the right to
jury trial cannot be waived unknowingly by mere insertion of a waiver provision on the
twentieth page of a twenty-two page standardized form contract").
45 E.g., Phoenix Leasing, Inc. v. Sure Broad., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (D. Nev.
1994) (upholding contractual jury trial waiver in commercial context); Connecticut Nat'l
Bank v. Smith, 826 F. Supp. 57, 59 (D.R.I. 1993) (upholding waiver secured in
commercial loan transaction).
46 E.g., Nat'l Westminster Bank v. Ross, 130 B.R. 656, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(enforcing jury trial waiver contained in commercial loan document).
47 E.g., Oei v. Citibank N.A., 957 F. Supp. 492, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that
letter of credit applicant in commercial transaction had waived jury trial right); Luis
Acosta Inc. v. Citibank N.A., 920 F. Supp. 15, 18-19 (D.P.R. 1996) (holding that
commercial lender failed to meet burden of showing waiver was knowing and
intentional); Sullivan v. Ajax Navigation Corp., 881 F. Supp. 906, 910-11 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (holding that passenger did not waive right to bring jury trial claim against ship
operator although back of ticket contained waiver provision).
48 E.g., Bonfield v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 589, 595 (N.D. ill.
1989) (upholding waiver on grounds that it was knowing and intelligent).
49 E.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 756-58 (6th Cir. 1985)
(applying "knowing and voluntary standard," found to be "overwhelmingly" used to
determine validity of contractual waivers, to conclude that oral representation at time of
contracting voided written waiver); Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Crane, 36 F. Supp. 2d
602, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (upholding waiver in commercial loan context held to be
knowing and voluntary); Westside-Marrero Jeep Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 56 F.
Supp. 2d 694, 706 (E.D. La. 1999) ("Waiver [of the jury trial right] requires only that the
party waiving such right do so 'voluntarily' and 'knowingly' based on the facts of the
case.").
5 0 See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 755-56 (6th Cir. 1985) (treating
as synonymous alternative phrasings of "knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally" and
"knowing and voluntary"). K.M.C. also explains the superficial inconsistency between
case law that permits inadvertent waiver of a jury trial, once an action has been
commenced, and case law that requires contractual jury trial waivers to be knowing and
intentional:
[W]e were initially troubled by the apparent inconsistency between application
of a knowing and voluntary standard to contractual waiver of jury trial, and
waiver by mere inadvertence under Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d), which provides that
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C. To Determine Whether Waivers are Knowing, Voluntary,
Intentional, and Intelligent, Courts Typically Look at a Series of
Overlapping Factors
While courts have not adopted an identical phrasing of the factors to be
considered in examining contractual jury trial waivers, there is substantial
agreement regarding what kinds of information is relevant. Courts typically
consider any actual negotiations over the clause, whether the clause was
presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the conspicuousness of the waiver,
the degree of bargaining disparity between the parties, and the experience
and sophistication of the party opposing the waiver.51 Courts have not been
explicit as to how these factors relate to one another, but seem to consider
them all together. Thus, it is not necessary to make a strong showing on all
of the factors to uphold a jury waiver clause.52 Equally, it is not necessary to
failure to file a timely demand constitutes waiver of trial by jury .... We are
convinced, however, that there is a sound rationale underlying the application of
different standards in the two instances. There is a significant distinction to be
drawn between a contractual waiver entered into before any cause of action has
arisen, and a party's procedural default once litigation has commenced in a
particular case.
Id. at 756 n.4.
51 E.g., Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Crane, 36 F. Supp. 2d 602, 603-04 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) ("The factors a court must consider in determining whether a contractual waiver of
a right to a jury trial was entered into knowingly and voluntarily include: 1) the
negotiability of contract terms and negotiations between the parties concerning the
waiver provision; 2) the conspicuousness of the waiver provision in the contract; 3) the
relative bargaining power of the parties; and 4) the business acumen of the party
opposing the waiver."); Oei v. Citibank, 957 F. Supp. 492, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("In
addressing jury waiver clauses, courts have consistently examined the following factors:
negotiability of the contract terms, disparity in bargaining power between the parties, the
business acumen of the party opposing the waiver, and the conspicuousness of the jury
waiver provision."); Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank, 920 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D.P.R. 1996) (in
determining whether waiver was knowing and intentional courts look to "whether the
waiver clause was set forth in bold and conspicuous lettering, or whether instead it was
buried deep in the contract," "whether the parties are sophisticated enough to have
comprehended the import of the language contained in the waiver," "whether or not the
parties were represented by counsel at the time of contracting," and "whether there is a
gross inequality in bargaining power between the parties"); Coop. Fin. Ass'n v. Garst, 871
F. Supp. 1168, 1172 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (stating that in determining the validity of a jury
trial waiver courts "have considered whether the waiver provision is on a standardized
form agreement or newly-drafted document, in fine print or in large or bold print, set off
in a paragraph of its own, in a take-it-or-leave-it or negotiated contract, and the length of
the contract").
52 See, e.g., Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 826 F. Supp. 57, 60-61 (D.R.I. 1993)
(upholding jury trial waiver, despite imposition through a standard form which borrower
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make a strong showing on all of the factors to defeat a jury waiver clause.53
Given these standards, courts uphold many jury trial waivers, particularly
those imposed in a commercial context. 54 However, when the consideration
of these factors show that the waiver was not entered voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently, as is more often the case outside the commercial context,
courts refuse to enforce the jury trial waivers. The following sections show
how courts have analyzed each factor.
1. Negotiability of the Waiver
In determining whether or not to enforce a jury trial waiver courts
examine both any negotiations that did take place regarding the clause, and
also whether or not the clause was presented on. a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
When the clause was actually the subject of negotiation, courts are more
likely to uphold the waiver, reasoning that the clause was at least accepted
knowingly.55 The fact that a clause was not negotiated will not necessarily be
was required to sign to get loan, given the degree of sophistication of the party opposing
waiver, the absence of an extreme bargaining disadvantage or gross disparity in
bargaining power, and the fact that the clause was not inconspicuous); Orix Credit
Alliance, Inc. v. Better Built Corp., No. 89 CIV. 7333 (JFK), 1990 WL 96992, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1990) (upholding jury tial waiver, although waiver opponents claimed
they were unaware of consequences of document, were not represented or advised by
counsel, and understood that they had no choice but to execute the documents where
opponents were business persons, where waiver was not buried in long agreements, and
where opponents could have chosen not to sign agreements).
53 See, e.g., Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 920 F. Supp. 15, 18-19 (D.P.R.
1996) (rejecting waiver although borrower was a shrewd and experienced businessman,
because lender failed to provide evidence of "the parties' specific negotiations over the
waiver, the conspicuousness of the provision, [and] the parties' relative bargaining
power"); AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Marino, Nos. 88-5522, 88-6197, 1990 WL
10024, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 1990) (rejecting clause, imposed on take-it-or-leave-it
basis, even though franchisees certainly had knowledge of the clause and even though
there is no evidence they either objected to the clause or even had any qualms about it).
54 Note that the Georgia Supreme Court, however, has held that all predispute
agreements to waive a jury trial are unenforceable under the Georgia Constitution and
statutes. Bank South N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799, 800 (Ga. 1994). See also Am. S.
Fin., Ltd. v. Yang, 448 S.E.2d 450 (Ga. 1994) (holding same). Interestingly and
inexplicably, this prohibition has not been applied to arbitration clauses. Bank South
N.A., 444 S.E.2d at 800 n.5 (citing statute governing enforcement of arbitration
provisions).
55 E.g., Okura & Co. v. Careau Group, 783 F. Supp. 482, 489 (C.D. Cal. 1991)
(observing that court previously upheld clause in part because provisions "had been
negotiated by the parties and were an essential aspect of the parties' bargain"); N.
Feldman & Sons, Ltd. v. Checker Motors Corp., 572 F. Supp. 310, 313 (upholding
waiver in part because contract as a whole "was the result of years of negotiation between
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used to void the waiver, however, where the court finds evidence, such as
negotiation over other clauses, showing that it could have been negotiated.56
Courts also examine the discussions, if any, surrounding inclusion of the
clause. They are more likely to uphold clauses that were accurately
explained. 57 At the same time, they are more likely to reject clauses that are
inaccurately explained. In K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.58 the Sixth Circuit
affirmed a district court's refusal to enforce a contractual jury trial waiver,
because the party opposing waiver submitted evidence showing that the
company president was told by a representative of the defendant, prior to
signing the agreement, that absent fraud the jury trial waiver would not be
enforced. 59 In these circumstances, held the Sixth Circuit, the waiver could
not be said to be either knowing or voluntary. 60
Courts are also more likely to reject waivers that were not specifically
discussed or bargained for. In Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of America,61 the
federal district court refused to enforce a jury trial waiver contained in the
Peugeot Dealer Agreement. In doing so the court emphasized that
the parties"). Cf. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-87 (1972)
(upholding confession-of-judgment clause in part because clause was actually negotiated
by company and its attorney, in return for consideration).
56 E.g., Westside-Marrero Jeep Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 694,
707 (E.D. La. 1999) (upholding waiver and stating "[a]lithough the terms of the contracts
were not negotiated, there is no indication that the terms were not negotiable,"
particularly given that dealer had previously negotiated certain contractual terms with
owner); Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Crane, 36 F. Supp. 2d 602, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(stating "[s]imply because the Cranes did not attempt to negotiate its provisions does not
mean that, in fact, the waiver or other terms in the note were not negotiable,"and
emphasizing that borrower had in fact negotiated changes in prior transaction with same
lender); Oei v. Citibank, 957 F. Supp. 492, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (enforcing jury waiver
clause contained in letter of credit application agreement, even though the provisions
were not negotiated and were created by the lender, because there was no reason to
believe the clause was not negotiable). The Oei court explained, "[t]he Application
Agreement was not like a ticket sold to a passenger boarding a cruise ship .... Second,
there was little disparity in bargaining power. Oei was Citibank's longtime customer...
and Citibank had an interest in accommodating him." Id.
57 See, e.g., Bonfield v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 589, 595 (N.D.
Ill. 1989) (upholding clause imposed on franchisees, in part because franchisor had
discussed the waiver with the franchisee during a board of review hearing, which
discussion is quoted by the court).
58 K.M.C. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
59 Id. at 758.
60 757 F.2d at 757. The court rejected the argument of the party defending the
waiver that the parole evidence rule should be used to exclude evidence regarding the
conversation. Id.
61 Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., 539 F. Supp. 402 (D. Col. 1982).
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"[d]efendants have presented no evidence that the waiver provision was a
bargained for term of the contract, was mentioned during negotiations, or
was even brought to the plaintiffs' attention."62
Courts have also shown a willingness to reject waivers which are
contained in form agreements and, thus, definitely or likely not subject to
negotiation. Courts reason that such clauses are less likely to be either
knowing or voluntary. 63 For example, in AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v.
Marino,64 the district court denied a franchiser's motion to dismiss its
franchisees' demand for a jury trial reasoning that franchisees "did not
voluntarily waive their right to a jury trial."65 Although each of the four
franchisees had stated they had read and understood the franchise
agreement, 66 and although three of the four "were specifically advised that
the franchise agreement contained a jury trial waiver provision,"67 the court
emphasized that the clause was presented as non-negotiable. 68
62 L at 403. See also Luis Acosta Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 920 F. Supp. 15, 18
(D.P.R. 1996) (rejecting waiver in part because lender presented no evidence as to parties'
specific negotiations over the waiver); Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. Sevaux, 866 F. Supp.
1102, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 1994) ("The absence of specific discussions or negotiations
concerning the jury waiver provision militates against a finding of waiver."); Heller Fin.,
Inc. v. Finch-Bayless Equip. Co., No. 90 C 1672 1990 WL 77500, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May
31, 1990) (rejecting jury trial waiver contained in commercial loan agreement, based in
part on observation that clause was not negotiated).
63 In Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of America, 539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D. Col. 1982),
the court refused to enforce a waiver in part because it was contained in a form contract.
"The 1978 Agreement appears to be Peugeot's standardized printed dealer contract,
drafted by Peugeot. Obviously, the plaintiffs had little, if any, opportunity to negotiate
the provisions. Absent proof to the contrary, such an inequality in relative bargaining
positions suggests that the asserted waiver was neither knowing nor intentional." Id. at
403. See also Sullivan v. Ajax Navigation Corp., 881 F. Supp. 906, 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(refusing to enforce ajury trial waiver contained as paragraph 8 of a cruise ticket); Heller
Fin., Inc. v. Finch-Bayless Equip. Co., No. 90 C 1672 1990 WL 77500, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
May 31, 1990) (rejecting jury trial waiver contained in commercial loan agreement and
stating "[w]here the waiver provision is set out in an unnegotiated form contract that is
not susceptible to negotiation, it is presumed that there was not a knowing waiver of the
right to a jury trial").
64 AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Marino, Nos. 88-5522, 88-6197, 1990 WL
10024 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 1990).
65 Marino, 1990 WL 10024, at *2.
66 Marino, 1990 WL 10024, at *1.
67 Marino, 1990 WL 10024, at *1.
68 "It is uncontested that the franchise agreement was presented to each.
franchisee/defendant as a non-negotiable 'take-it-or-leave-it' proposition. AAMCO told
defendant Lopes that the terms of the franchise agreement were 'locked in concrete,' and
were not subject to negotiation." Marino, 1990 WL 10024, at *2. Thus, concluded the
court, "[i]n essence each defendant was compelled to sign the franchise agreement as
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Yet, mere non-negotiability of a clause is not always sufficient to void a
jury trial waiver. In Bonfield v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc.,69 the court
upheld a non-negotiable clause, explaining that although the franchisee could
not have changed the clause, he was perfectly free to reject the deal in its
entirety.70 In Smyly v. Hyundai Motor America,71 the court went much
further. In an unusual decision, it upheld a clause that was not noticed by a
dealer in part because the court found that even had the dealer noticed and
protested the clause, the manufacturer likely would not have negotiated it,
and the dealer likely would not have refused to be a dealer solely because of
the jury trial provision.72
2. Conspicuousness of the Waiver
Courts have frequently concerned themselves with the clarity and
conspicuousness of the waiver, reasoning that an inconspicuous clause was
not likely agreed to knowingly or intentionally. 73 The conspicuousness of
the clause depends upon such things as font size, typeface, and placement.
Courts are more likely to uphold waivers that are displayed in large typeface,
bold, or capital lettering.74 They are also more likely to uphold waivers that
presented if he wanted to acquire an AAMCO franchise." Marino, 1990 WL 10024, at
*2. ("It is understandable that a national franchiser would feel compelled to treat all
franchisees uniformly and insist on standard franchise agreements. Further, there is no
evidence that any of the defendants objected to or even had any qualms about the waiver
provision of which they certainly had knowledge. On the record in this case, however, it
is clear that the defendants possessed virtually no bargaining power and that the waiver
provision was not subject to negotiation.").
69 Bonfield v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
70 Id. at 596 ("It is true that Cades specifically told Bonfield AAMCO would accept
no changes in the contract. But, AAMCO's stated unwillingness to accept contract
changes-its 'take it or leave it' position-does not vitiate Bonfield's waiver. Nothing
compelled him to accept AAMCO's franchise-he was perfectly free to reject the deal.")
See also Coop. Fin. Ass'n v. Garst, 871 F. Supp. 1168, 1172 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (stating
that although party seeking jury trial asserts "he was compelled by family considerations
to enter into the agreement," such allegations "do not negate his ability to review and
negotiate the terms of the agreement, [in that tihere is no evidence that [he] could not
have sought renewal or replacement financing elsewhere if he had objected to the terms
of CFA's loan").
71 Smyly v. Hyundai Motor Am., 762 F. Supp. 428 (D. Mass. 1991).
72 Id. at 430.
73 See, e.g., Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank N.A., 920 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D.P.R. 1996)
(stating that although fundamental jury trial right may be waived, waiver "must be clear
and unequivocal").
74 E.g., Westside-Marrero Jeep Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 694,
708 (E.D. La. 1999) (upholding jury trial waiver contained in agreement between
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are placed in a key location, such as near the signature line of the
agreement.75 At a minimum, courts usually look to see that the typeface was
not particularly small, and that the clause was not buried in a long
agreement.76 In contrast, courts are more likely to reject clauses that are
printed in small type, or buried in a long agreement.77 Courts have also
automobile dealership and its owners, in part because clauses "were clearly.written, in
most instances in block print, just above the signature line"); Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v.
Crane, 36 F. Supp. 2d 602, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (upholding waiver deemed to be "quite
conspicuous" in part because it "was written in all capital letters"); Phoenix Leasing Inc.
v. Sure Broad. Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (D. Nev. 1994) (upholding jury trial waiver
in part because it was printed in capital letters, and placed as last paragraph above the
signature line).
75 E.g., Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Crane, 36 F. Supp. 2d 602, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(upholding waiver in commercial loan deemed to be "quite conspicuous" in part because
it was located "on the signature page itself, . . . immediately preced[ing] the . . .
signatures"); Oei v. Citibank, N.A., 957 F. Supp. 492, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (enforcing
jury waiver clause contained in letter of credit application agreement, where waiver was
"highly bonspicuous" in that it was "set off in its own paragraph, right above the signature
line"); Coop. Fin. Ass'n v. Garst, 871 F. Supp. 1168, 1172 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (upholding
waiver contained in contract between commercial ranch owner and lender, where clause
was "set off in its own paragraph, in type identical to that of every other provision of the
loan agreement," and where clause was placed "near the end of a [four page] document
just before the signatures and just before a warning to read the entire document").
76 See, e.g., Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir.
1988) (upholding jury trial waiver contained in agreement for lease of oil drilling rig,
where parties to agreement were both "sophisticated" and where the provision "was in the
normal print size of the contract"); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th
Cir. 1986) (upholding jury trial waiver contained in commercial lease agreement that was
just two pages long, even though waiver was not set off in a separate paragraph and even
though it was "in the ninetieth line of print and is in the middle of a thirty-eight line
paragraph"); Connecticut Natl Bank v. Smith, 826 F. Supp. 57, 60-61 (D.R.I. 1993)
(upholding jury trial waiver in commercial loan, even though the clauses '"were not set
out in their own paragraphs or written in bold print," because here the agreements were
only four pages long, contained just three pages of.text, the language of the waiver was
clear and definite, the waiver clauses were located at the end of a paragraph, the waiver
clause was located just two inches'above the signature line, and the clauses were set out
in print that was entirely legible and no smaller than the rest of the print in the document).
77 E.g., Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d' Cir. 1977)
(rejecting validity of jury trial waiver in commercial lease, where provision was "literally
buried in the eleventh paragraph of a fine print, sixteen clause agreement," noting that the
clause "was set deeply and inconspicuously in the contract," and noting that it is not
credible that laymen would have known or even suspected the meaning of the clause);
Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank, 920 F. Supp. 15, 19 (D.P.R. 1996) (rejecting clause not
shown to be conspicuous in commercial loan, particularly given that "the waiver clause is
not in boldface and is buried at the end of the contract"); Hydramar, Inc. v. Gen.
Dynamics Corp., Civ. A. No. 85-1788, 1989 WL 159267, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1989)
(rejecting jury trial waiver contained in commercial contract as too inconspicuous
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rejected clauses that were relatively conspicuous, on the ground that mere
conspicuousness was not enough to show the waiver was knowing and
voluntary.78
3. Disparity of Bargaining Power Between the Parties
Courts consider an array of facts in determining whether a jury trial
waiver is invalid due to a disparity of bargaining power. When a party
essentially had no choice but to sign the agreement, perhaps because the
party was in desperate financial straits, some courts have held that the waiver
is void, essentially finding that the waiver was not voluntary. 79 Further, as
noted above in the section on "negotiability," courts are more likely to reject
clauses contained in form agreements, that were therefore not subject to
because it was contained in thirty-fourth section of a twenty page document which was
itself merely referenced, together with other documents, in purchase order signed by
plaintiff); Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D. Col. 1982)
(rejecting jury trial waiver in contract between automobile dealer and manufacturer, and
stating "[a] constitutional guarantee so fundamental as the right to jury trial cannot be
waived unknowingly by mere insertion of a waiver provision on the twentieth page of a
twenty-two page standardized form contract"). But see Smyly v. Hyundai Motor Am.,
762 F. Supp. 428, 428-30 (D. Mass. 1991) (upholding jury trial waiver, even though it
was contained on page twenty-nine of "standard terms" which were not provided to
dealer until after he had agreed to accept terms, where clause was noted in table of
contents of standard terms, and where dealer was sophisticated businessman who failed
to inquire about standard terms, and where court found that dealer would not have
rejected contract had he been aware of jury trial waiver provision).
78 E.g., Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. Sevaux, 866 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(rejecting clause that was printed in capital letters, because "it was not so conspicuous as
to insure a knowing and voluntary waiver"); Heller Fin. Inc. v. Finch-Bayless Equip. Co.,
No. 90 C 1672, 1990 WL 77500 (N.D. El. May 31, 1990) (refusing to enforce waiver in
commercial lease that was "found on the last page of a five-page contract, seven lines
above the signature block," on grounds that it was part of unnegotiated form contract, as
well as that the jury trial waiver was not so obvious that it must have been known to the
signatory of the agreement).
79 E.g., Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977)
(rejecting jury waiver provision in part because it was clear borrower "did not have any
choice but to accept the NER contract as written if he was to get badly needed funds");
Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. Sevaux, 866 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (rejecting
waiver in part because there was unequal bargaining power in that borrower's company
"desperately needed an infusion of cash"). Cf. In re Reggie Packing Co., 671 F. Supp.
571, 573 (N.D. 111. 1987) (upholding jury trial waiver, even though borrower argued that
company desperately needed financing and that lender was only available source of credit
at time of loan, where court found that borrower was assisted by an attorney and where
borrower had been successful in altering several contractual provisions).
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negotiation.8" In Sullivan v. Ajax Navigation Corp.,8 1 the district court
refused to enforce a jury trial waiver contained on the back of a cruise ship
ticket. It stated,
[D]efendant has not sought to prove, other than by referring to the
placement and font size of the waiver clause, that the non-purchasing
plaintiff82 was aware that she was relinquishing a constitutional right at the
time she boarded the cruise ship. The contract, with its standardized
language, was drafted by the defendant. Further, it was non-negotiable;
plaintiff had no choice other than to accept the contract as written. Absent
proof to the contrary, such an inequality in relative bargaining positions
suggests that the asserted waiver was neither knowing nor intentional. 8 3
On the other hand, when both parties were relatively sophisticated
businesses, many courts have been more willing to enforce the waiver,
finding it sufficient even if there was not absolute equality of bargaining
power.84 Several courts have emphasized that a company often has the
option simply not to complete the transaction to which a jury trial waiver is
attached. 85 When a relatively weak party is represented by an attorney, some
courts have found that the representation is sufficient to allay concerns about
80 See supra text accompanying notes 61-68.
81 Sullivan v. Ajax Navigation Corp., 881 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
82 The ticket of the plaintiff in Sullivan was purchased by her traveling companion,
who kept it until the time of embarkation. Id. at 907.
83 Id. at 911.
84 In Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Crane, 36 F. Supp. 2d 602, 604 (S.D.N.Y.
1999), upholding a jury trial waiver, the court stated, "although there was clearly a
difference in bargaining power between the sides-as there would be between a major
bank and virtually any two individuals-the Cranes were not financial neophytes. They
had established relationships with a number of Morgan officials over approximately one
year, and the fact that the Cranes had previously negotiated changes to agreements with
Morgan further demonstrates their ability to negotiate with the bank."
85 E.g., Westside-Marrero Jeep Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 694,
708-709 (E.D. La. 1999) (recognizing that there was some inequality of bargaining
power, where plaintiffs asserted they had to sign the contracts in order to secure the
funding necessary to procure the desired dealership, but holding that this inequality was
not sufficient to void the waiver given that plaintiffs "produced no evidence that they
could not have gone elsewhere for financing had they found CFC's terms oppressive");
Phoenix Leasing Inc. v. Sure Broad., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379, 1385 (D. Nev. 1994)
(upholding waiver, even though borrower claimed that lender "had a near monopoly with
the field of start up loans for fledgling cable companies," and observing that "[t]he ability
to take out a loan to start up a profit making cable company is not a necessity of life such
that Defendant was compelled to accept Plaintiff's loan on whatever terms it was
offered").
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the party's lack of bargaining power.86 Representation can be important even
when the attorney did not actually review the waiver provision. 87 However,
lack of representation is not likely sufficient, absent other factors, to void a
waiver.88
4. Business or Professional Experience and Sophistication of the
Party Opposing the Waiver
Courts are more likely to accept a contractual waiver of a jury trial right
when the party opposing the waiver was relatively well educated, or was a
sophisticated or experienced lawyer or businessperson. 89  Courts are
86 In re Reggie Packing, 671 F. Supp. 571, 573 (N.D. I11. 1987) (relying, in part, on
fact that borrower was represented by attorney, to uphold jury trial waiver even though
borrower argued that company desperately needed financing and that lender was only
available source of credit at time of loan).
87 Bonfield v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 589, 595 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(upholding clause in part because franchisee "was represented by counsel, though he
chose not to have his lawyer review the Agreement").
88 See, e.g., Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Better Built Corp., No. 89 CIV. 7333
(JFK), 1990 WL 96992, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1990) ("Although the presence of
counsel at contract negotiations is recommended, the absence of counsel by itself does
not destroy the validity of agreements signed or create an unequal bargaining position.");
N. Feldman & Son, Ltd. v. Checker Motors Corp., 572 F. Supp. 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y 1983)
(upholding waiver, although opponent was not represented by counsel and contract was
boilerplate, reasoning that the waiver provision was conspicuous and that agreement was
result of years of negotiations between parties).
89 E.g., Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1988)
(upholding jury trial waiver contained in agreement for lease of oil drilling rig, where
parties to agreement were both "sophisticated"); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d
828, 830, 833 (4th Cir. 1986) (upholding jury trial waiver contained in equipment lease
totaling $295,000, and emphasizing that lessees were "manifestly shrewd businessmen
who had been in a generally successful drilling business for sixteen years," and further
emphasizing that although lessees did not read or write, one of their wives had read the
proposed lease, crossed out some language, and prepared an additional handwritten
document); Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Crane, 36 F. Supp. 2d 602, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(upholding waiver given that borrowers were "experienced business people," in that one
was an inventor and founder of a technology company whose stock is publicly traded,
and the other is the company's Vice President of Strategic Business, and also Acting
Chief Financial Officer, and where both had engaged in sophisticated business
transactions such as a buyout of other shareholders, and licensing agreements);
Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 826 F. Supp. 57, 60 (D.R.I. 1993) (emphasizing, in
upholding clause, that the company president who was seeking to avoid the jury trial
waiver was an "experienced businessman and attorney," who had "graduated from Yale
Law School in 1963 and subsequently served as a law clerk for both the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Supreme Court of the State of
Connecticut," and thereafter became a partner at a New York law firm before going on to
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particularly willing to uphold waivers as applied to sophisticated parties who
were represented by counsel, 90 even when counsel did not actually review
the agreement.91
On the other hand, courts are more likely to void waivers that are
imposed on persons who are lacking in formal education and business
experience. 92 Moreover, numerous courts have also voided waivers imposed
on experienced business persons, particularly where the business person was
not represented by an attorney,93 or where the showing on some of the other
factors was strong.94
become president and/or CEO of "several substantial corporations"); Nat'l Westminster
Bank v. Ross, 130 B.R. 656, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (upholding jury trial waiver, in part
given facts that opponent of waiver had a bachelor's degree in political science, an
M.B.A. from Harvard Business School, was the CEO and majority shareholder of a
corporation with annual sales of $9 million, and had six years of experience in
negotiating complex financial transactions worth billions of dollars).
90 E.g., Phoenix Leasing Inc. v. Sure Broad. Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379, 1385 (D. Nev.
1994) (emphasizing, in upholding jury trial waiver, that party protesting waiver not only
was sophisticated and experienced professional, but also was represented by counsel at
many different stages); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 826 F. Supp. 57, 60 (D.R.I.
1993) (emphasizing fact, in upholding waiver, that company president was represented
by counsel, as well as that he was a Yale educated attorney with substantial legal and
business experience).
91 See, e.g., Westside-Marrero Jeep Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d
694, 708 (E.D. La. 1999) (upholding jury trial waiver in part because experienced
businessperson was represented by counsel, even though attorney did not actually review
agreement); Bonfield v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 589, 595 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (holding same).
92 See, e.g., Sullivan v. AJAX Navigation Corp., 881 F. Supp. 906, 911 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (refusing to enforce waiver contained on back of cruise ticket). See also Rodenbur
v. Kaufmann, 320 F.2d 679, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (narrowly interpreting jury waiver
imposed on non-commercial tenant). Despite my serious research attempts, I located
almost no cases involving Seventh Amendment jury trial waivers imposed outside the
commercial context. My supposition is that companies are hesitant to insert jury trial
waivers in such contexts, because they fear they will be deemed unenforceable.
Alternatively, it may be that such clauses are included but rarely litigated, at least in
published opinions.
93 E.g., Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. Sevaux, 866 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(rejecting waiver imposed on successful businessman who was not familiar with
American legal system, noting also that attorney who represented firm was not shown
also to have represented firm's sole shareholder regarding execution of the note); Heller
Fin., Inc. v. Finch-Bayless Equip. Co., No. 90 C 1672, 1990 WL 77500, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill.
1990 May 31, 1990) (rejecting jury trial waiver contained in commercial loan agreement,
in part because borrower of over $400,000 was not represented by counsel).
94 See, e.g., Heller Fin. Inc. v. Finch-Bayless Equip. Co., Inc., No. 90 C 1672, 1990
WL 77500 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 1990) (rejecting waiver imposed on corporation in business
of leasing and selling heavy equipment, which had signed agreements to borrow more
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D. This Author has Located No Cases Upholding Contractual Jury
Trial Waivers When Companies Seek to Impose Them Through
Unsigned, Uninitialed Clauses
Outside the arbitration context, it appears to be very uncommon for a
company to attempt to impose a jury trial waiver in a document which is not
signed. That is, it is seemingly quite rare for companies to attempt to impose
jury trial waivers using envelope stuffers, employee handbooks, unsigned
warranties, or the like. The one such case this author has located, Sullivan v.
Ajax Navigation Corp.,95 involved a jury trial waiver contained in paragraph
8 of the cruise ticket provided to plaintiff. The district court refused to
enforce the waiver, holding it was not knowing and intentional. 96
It is not coincidental that virtually all cases discussing the waiver of jury
trial rights, outside the arbitration context, involve situations in which the
person or company opposing waiver signed a document expressly calling for
waiver of the jury trial right. Clearly it is much easier to show that a waiver
was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent where the person who purportedly
accepted the waiver actually signed a document than where a clause was
merely imposed, in small print, in an envelope stuffer or other item that may
well have been disregarded. As the court stated in Cooperative Finance Ass'n
v. Garst,97 "[t]he party seeking to enforce a waiver can prepare to meet that
burden by careful drafting of the provision, its conspicuous presentation, and
preparation of a record that the provision was explained and reviewed, for
example, by requiring that the provision be initialed. "98
than $400,000); AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Marino, Nos. 88-5522, 88-6197, 1990
WL 10024, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 1990) (rejecting jury trial waiver imposed on
franchisees, even though three of the four franchisees admitted that they had read and
understood the franchise agreement, on ground that clause was non-negotiable); Dreiling
v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D. Col. 1982) (rejecting jury trial
waiver imposed on Peugeot car dealers, without finding that they were ignorant or
inexperienced business persons).
95 Sullivan v. Ajax Navigation Corp., 88 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
96 Id. at 910.
97 Coop. Fin. Ass'n v. Garst, 871 F. Supp. 1168, 1172 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
98 Id. at 1172 n.2.
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E. Most Courts Addressing the Issue Have Held That the Party
Seeking to Establish Contractual Waiver of the Jury Trial Bears the
Burden of Proof to Establish That the Waiver Was "Knowing,
Voluntary and Intentional"
Many courts have found it unnecessary to resolve the important question
of whether it is the proponent or the opponent of a jury trial waiver who
bears the burden of proving that the waiver was sufficiently knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent. Instead, such courts have often concluded that the
waiver is either valid or not valid, regardless of which party bears the burden
of proof.9 9
Of those courts that have decided this question, most have held that it is
the proponent of the waiver who bears the burden, reasoning that the jury
trial right is fundamental, and should not be waived absent clear evidence.100
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has placed the burden on the opponent of the
waiver, contending that principles favoring liberty of contract support
enforcement of the waiver.101
99 See, e.g., Westside-Marrero Jeep Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d
694, 707 (E.D. La. 1999) ("Because the court finds clear contractual waiver in this case,
it need not determine whether the burden is on plaintiffs or defendants."); Whirlpool Fin.
Corp. v. Sevaux, 866 F. Supp. 1102, 1105 (N.D. Ill. 1994) ("Although this circuit has not
decided which party bears the burden of proving the validity of an alleged waiver, it is
clear in this case that Sevaux did not voluntarily and knowingly waive his right to a jury
trial."); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Hollis, 826 F. Supp. 57, 60 (D.R.I. 1993) (stating court
need not decide who bears burden, because in any event waiver is valid).
100 See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 1986)
("Where waiver is claimed under a contract executed before litigation is contemplated,
we agree with those courts that have held that the party seeking enforcement of the
waiver must prove that consent was both voluntary and informed."); Nat'l Equip. Rental
Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977) (implying that party defending waiver
bears burden of proof); Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 920 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D.P.R.
1996) (rejecting waiver, after concluding that "the burden of proving the waiver of such
a fundamental right properly rests upon the party seeking to enforce such a waiver");
Phoenix Leasing Inc. v. Sure Broadcasting, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (D. Nev. 1994)
("An informal survey indicates the majority of courts having considered this question
followed the approach in Leasing Service [and placed burden of proof on proponent of
waiver]."); Smyly v. Hyundai Motor Am., 762 F. Supp. 428, 429 (D. Mass. 1991)
(concluding that "since it is a waiver of a constitutional right," proponent of waiver bears
burden of showing agreement was made knowingly and intentionally).
101 See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 758 (6th Cir. 1985). The
Sixth Circuit cites, as authority, the 1984 second edition of Moore's Federal Practice,
Which it quotes as stating, "In determining whether to give effect to the contractual
waiver against an objecting party the court should start with a presumption in favor of
validity in the interest of liberty of contract." 757 F.2d at 758 (quoting 5 JAMES WM.
MOORE Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.46, at 38-400 (2d ed. 1984). However, it is
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F. Several Courts Have Held That Jury Trial Waivers Must Be
Narrowly Construed to Ensure Protection of the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial
The Seventh Amendment jury trial right may affect the interpretation or
construction of a waiver, as well as the initial determination of whether any
waiver was made. Relying on this clause, several courts have interpreted
jury trial waivers narrowly and, thus, have not applied them to some of the
claims at issue. In narrowly interpreting a waiver provision, the district court
in Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank'0 2 stated, "[c]aution is . . . advisable in
interpreting the scope of a clause that would putatively waive a fundamental
right."'1 3 The district court in National Acceptance Co. v. MYCA Products
Inc. 104 similarly stated that because the Seventh Amendment jury trial right is
fundamental, "[c]ourts will narrowly construe any waiver of this
right .... "105 In addition, the D.C. Circuit, in Rodenbur v. Kaufniann,I0 6
found that although a tenant's lease did contain a jury trial waiver, the clause
did not apply to the negligence claim plaintiff brought when she slipped and
fell on the property. It explained that,
The clause, strictly construed as it must be, did not bar a jury trial as to
rights which the tenant might have against the landlords unless issues with
respect thereto arose out of or were in some way connected with the lease of
her apartment. Such is the plain meaning of the language. 107
interesting that the current version of Moore's Federal Practice states only that "the case
law is not clear as to who bears the burden of proving waiver." 8 JAMES WM. MOORE ET
AL., FEDERALPRACTICE I 38.52[1][d] (3d ed. 2000).
t02 Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 920 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D.P.R. 1996).
103 Id. (holding that jury trial waiver contained in "factor lien agreement" entered
into between commercial borrower and bank applied only to disputes arising under that
agreement, even though bank argued that the waiver "was effectively extended to all of
the other contracts, or at the very least, to the Loan Agreement, by a series of provisions
that tied together all of the contracts").
104 Nat'l Acceptance Co. v. MYCA Prods., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 269, 270 (W.D. Pa.
1974).
105 Id. (holding that jury trial waiver contained in Loan and Security Agreement
relates only to an action arising directly out of that agreement, and not to other disputes
between the parties).
106 Rodenbur v. Kaufmann, 320 F.2d 679, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
107 Id. See also Okura & Co. v. Careau Group, 783 F. Supp. 482, 491 (C.D. Cal.
1991) (holding that jury trial waivers contained in financing agreement, promissory
692
[Vol. 16:3 2001]
THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
In interpreting a jury trial waiver narrowly, some courts -have also
emphasized "the basic principle that ambiguities in a contract are construed
against the drafting party."'10 8
G. Summary on Interpretation of Contractual Jury Trial Waivers
In interpreting contractual jury trial waivers, courts employ a fairly
standard analysis. Most courts explain that because the jury trial right is
"fundamental," they will indulge every presuniption against waiver. The
courts then enforce the waivers only when they are found to be knowing,
voluntary, and intentional. To make this determination, they look at a series
of overlapping factors relating to the negotiability of the waiver: whether it
was actually negotiated, whether counsel assisted with the negotiation,
whether the waiver was clear and conspicuous; whether there was a
significant disparity of bargaining power, and whether the party opposing the
waiver is relatively knowledgeable and sophisticated.
Most of the Seventh Amendment contractual jury trial waiver cases
discussed above involve commercial transactions, most frequently loans,
leasing agreements, and franchise or distribution contracts. Given that these
transactions almost always involved large sums of money and relatively
sophisticated parties, it is not surprising that courts frequently upheld the
waivers, concluding for example that the language was sufficiently clear, that
the parties at least had the power not to participate in the transaction, and that
any disparity of bargaining power was not so severe as to void the
agreement.
It is quite striking, however, that even in these relatively sophisticated
commercial contexts, some courts refused to enforce contractual jury trial
waivers. For example, in Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank,01 9 the district court
refused to enforce a jury trial waiver included in a commercial loan
agreement, even though it recognized that the borrower was a shrewd and
experienced businessman, because the lender failed to provide evidence of
"the parties' specific negotiations over the waiver, the conspicuousness of the
provision, nor the parties' relative bargaining power." 110 In another
notes, and individual defendants' personal guaranties applied to most but not all of the
disputes between the parties).
108 Nat'lAcceptance Co., 381 F. Supp. at271 (holding thatjury trial waiver contained
in Loan and Security Agreement did not apply to claim for damages based on alleged breach
of oral agreement entered into more than two years after initial agreement).
109 Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 920 F. Supp. 15 (D.P.R. 1996).
110 Id. at 19.
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commercial loan case, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,111 a case involving a
line of credit for more than $3 million, 112 the court refused to enforce a
contractual jury trial waiver because the borrower submitted evidence
showing the lender had lulled the borrower into signing by assuring the
borrower that the waiver would not be enforced, absent fraud.113 Courts
have voided jury trial waivers in the franchise and distribution contexts as
well. In AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Marino,114 a case involving a
dispute between franchiser and franchisee, the court rejected the jury trial
waiver on the ground that it was imposed on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, even
though the record showed franchisees had prior knowledge of the clause and
did not show they had objected to it.115 As well, in Dreiling v. Peugeot
Motors of America, Inc.,116 the court refused to enforce a jury trial waiver
contained in the dealer agreement explaining that that the franchiser failed to
prove the term was explicitly bargained for or brought to franchisee's
attention. 117 In the leasing context, the Second Circuit voided the jury trial
waiver clause in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix,118 a case
involving leases of equipment requiring monthly payments of over $3,000.119
It concluded the waiver was too inconspicuous and that the lessee had no
choice but to accept the provision. 120 And, in Hydramar, Inc. v. General
Dynamics Corp.,121 the court found a jury trial waiver contained in a
I11 K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
112 Id. at 758.
113 Id. at 758. See also Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. Sevaux, 866 F. Supp. 1102, 1106
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (voiding jury trial waiver, in transaction involving loan for $1 million,
reasoning that while borrower was sophisticated businessman he was not familiar with
the U.S. legal system, and noting that the clause was never discussed, relatively
inconspicuous, and that the borrower badly needed the loan); Heller Fin. Inc. v. Finch-
Bayless Equip. Co., No. 90 C 1672, 1990 WL 77500 (N.D. I11. May 31, 1990) (refusing
to uphold waiver contained in transaction involving loans totaling over $400,000,
because clause was relatively inconspicuous, borrower claimed not to have read the
waiver, it was contained in form agreement, and borrower was not represented). Cf. Nat'l
Acceptance Co., 381 F. Supp. at 270 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (interpreting jury trial waiver
contained in commercial loan agreement narrowly, not to cover dispute at hand).
114 AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Marino, Nos. 88-5522, 88-6197, 1990 WL
10024 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 1990).
115 AAMCO Transmissions, 1990 WL 10024, at *2.
116 Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 402 (D. Col. 1982).
117 Id. at 403.
118 Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977).
1 1 9 Id. at 257.
120 Id. at 258.
121 Hydramar, Inc. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., No. Civ. A. 85-1788, 1989 WL 159267
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1989).
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commercial ship construction contract too inconspicuous to be
enforceable. 122
This Author located just two Seventh Amendment cases involving non-
commercial situations, a fact which may reflect companies' recognition that
such jury trial waivers are not likely to be upheld. In both cases, the jury trial
waiver was not enforced. First, in Sullivan v. AJAX Navigation Corp.,123 the
case most similar to those cases in which companies use form contracts of
adhesion to impose binding arbitration on consumers or employees,, the
Southern District of New York found that a jury trial waiver contained on the
back of a cruise ship ticket was not enforceable. 124  In Rodenbur v.
Kaufinann,125 a case involving a tenant in an apartment on the fourth floor of
a fifty eight-unit apartment building, the court did not rule on the overall
validity of the jury trial waiver contained in the lease but concluded the
waiver must in any event be interpreted narrowly, so that it did not cover
plaintiffs personal injury claim. 12 6
IE. COURTS FAIL TO EMPLOY TRADITIONAL JURY TRIAL ANALYSIS
WHEN DECIDING ARBITRATION CASES
Although it is evident that an agreement to arbitrate includes a waiver of
jury trial rights, courts do not employ the analysis outlined above in
interpreting arbitration clauses. Yet, with very few exceptions, courts do not
address this dichotomy, but rather simply determine the enforceability of
arbitration clauses using an entirely different set of principles than they use
when determining the enforceability of jury trial waivers. Specifically,
courts treat arbitration clauses as ordinary contractual provisions, requiring
no special protections, rather than as jury trial waivers. 127 Indeed, some
courts have interpreted federal arbitration policy to require them to adopt
122 Id. at *4.
123 Sullivan v. AJAX Navigation Corp., 881 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
124 The court simply found that in merely pointing to the language, font size and
placement of the waiver on the ticket, defendant had failed to meet its burden of showing
that the traveler was aware she was relinquishing a constitutional right at the time she
boarded the cruise ship. Id. at 911. While the court did mention that plaintiffs ticket was'
purchased by her companion, who kept it until they boarded the ship, id. at 907, the court
at no time suggests this fact was critical to its analysis.
125 Rodenbur v. Kaufmann, 320 F.2d 679, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
126 d. at 364-65. In Gaylord Department Stores of Alabama v. Stephens, 404 So.
2d 586, 588 (Ala. 1981), a state court decision, the court applied a similar standard and
concluded that ajury trial waiver contained in the agreement between a pharmacist and a
department store was not valid because it was buried in paragraph thirty-four of the
agreement and also due to the disparity in bargaining power.
127 See infra text accompanying notes 140-81.
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special presumptions favoring arbitration, thereby justifying an even more
lenient waiver standard than would be appropriate in a typical contractual
context. 128 The sub-sections which follow discuss the approach most courts
take in interpreting arbitration clauses. 129 They will draw on some state as
well as federal decisions, even though the Seventh Amendment is only
applicable in federal court, because the federal and state courts have
approached arbitration clauses similarly. 130
A. Many Courts State That Because Arbitration Is "Favored" or
"Preferred," They Will Indulge Presumptions In Favor of
Arbitration
The U.S. Supreme Court has led the way in stating that arbitration is
"favored," and has cited the Federal Arbitration Act as supporting this
position. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp.,131 in 1983, the Court stated,
[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration .... The Arbitration Act establishes that,
as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at
hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability. 132
128 See infra text accompanying notes 131-39, 182-87.
129 It should be noted, however, that a few courts derive a stricter standard of
consent from certain federal statutes, and therefore enforce arbitration agreements
covering such claims only when the arbitration was agreed to knowingly, or knowingly
and voluntarily. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir.
1994) (rejecting agreement to arbitrate Title VII claim on ground it was not "knowing");
Kummetz v. Tech Mold, Inc., 152 F.3d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 1998) (refusing to enforce
agreement to arbitrate ADA claim because it was not "knowing"); Penn v. Ryan's Family
Steakhouses, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 940, 955 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (refusing to enforce
agreement to arbitrate ADA claim because agreement was not found to be "knowing and
voluntary").
130 Actually, although one might have expected that the federal courts would apply
the Seventh Amendment to require a tougher waiver standard than is applied in state
courts, it seems that federal courts are actually more willing to enforce arbitration clauses
than are state courts. See Jean R. Stemlight, Forum Shopping for Arbitration Decisions:
Federal Courts' Use of Antisuit Injunctions Against State Courts, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 91,
93-94 (1998).
131 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
132 Id. at 24-25. Significantly, and as I have discussed elsewhere, the Court did not
provide any clear rationale for why arbitration should be favored over litigation. See Jean
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I Because it finds arbitration "favored," the Court has interpreted defenses
to arbitration narrowly, 133 interpreted arbitration clauses broadly, 134 and
mandated arbitration in a broad array of areas. 135 Lower federal courts have
similarly emphasized the "favored" status of arbitration in determining that
an agreement to arbitrate exists, 136 interpreting arbitration clauses broadly, 137
R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 660-61 (1996).
133 Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25 (stating that such defenses to arbitration as
laches, estoppel and waiver should be interpreted narrowly).
134 See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995)
(citing policy favoring arbitration to support decision allowing arbitrators to award
punitive damages).
135 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citing
"favoritism" policy in holding that claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act can be arbitrated); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
481 (1989) (mentioning "favoritism" policy in holding that securities fraud claims are
arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985) (stating that although "the parties' intentions control . . . those intentions are
generously construed as to issues of arbitrability").
136 See, e.g., McClendon v. Sherwin Williams, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 940, 942 (E.D.
Ark. 1999) (taking note of "broad federal policy favoring arbitration" in concluding that
handbook language was sufficient to constitute offer of arbitration, and that plaintiff
agreed to submit future disputes to binding arbitration by remaining an employee);
Cooper v. Citigroup, Inc., No. Civ. A 3:99-CV-1471-G, 1999 WL 1007664, at *1-2
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 1999) (mem.) (noting that "[b]oth federal and applicable state law
strongly favor arbitration," in concluding that employee agreed to binding arbitration
where employee handbook called for binding arbitration, and where employee had signed
a statement acknowledging that she had received the handbook and would comply with
all company procedures and policies).
137 See, e.g., Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 72 F.3d 793, 798 (10th Cir. 1995)
("Notwithstanding the ambiguity [over whether the clause applies to the dispute at hand].
. (or perhaps more correctly, because of such ambiguity), we conclude that the most
appropriate construction . . . is to apply [the] arbitration provisions to employment
disputes involving these Plaintiffs."); Am. Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal
Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding request for arbitration may not be
denied "unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute"); Webb v. Investacorp,
Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 259 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding, in light of preference for arbitration, that
clause covers disputes even though it "could have been drafted with more precision");
Gregory v. Electro-Mechanical Corp., 83 F.3d 382, 384 (11th Cir. 1996) (interpreting
arbitration clause broadly, as covering tort, fraud and deceit claims as well as breach of
contract claims); Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50, 53-54 (7th Cir. 1995)
(citing federal policy favoring arbitration in interpreting clause broadly to cover statutory
as well as contractual claims); David L. Threlkeld & Co., Inc. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd.,
923 F.2d 245, 245-51 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that federal policy favoring arbitration
means that clauses should be interpreted as broadly as possible).
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interpreting defenses to arbitration narrowly, 138 and holding that a vast array
of disputes are subject to mandatory arbitration. 139
B. Many Courts Have Upheld Arbitration Clauses That Were Not
Accepted "Knowingly, Voluntarily And Intentionally"
Courts do not generally require that contracts be entered into knowingly,
voluntarily, or intelligently. Thus, instead of using such subjective measures
for contractual validity as comprehending or even actual assent, they typically
use an objective test. As commentator Stephen Ware puts it,
The requirement to form a contract is not that parties actually assent to its
terms. The requirement is that they take actions-such as signing their
names on a document or saying certain words-that would lead a
reasonable person to believe that they have assented to the terms of the
contract. In other words, contract formation technically requires, not
mutual assent, but mutual manifestations of assent. Contract law does this
to satisfy "the inescapable need of individuals in society and those trying to
administer a coherent legal system to rely on appearances-to rely on an
individual's behavior that apparently manifests their assent to a transfer of
entitlements. 140
Professor Ware then defends the application of these general contract
principles to arbitration, pleading "to keep anti-contract approaches out of
arbitration law and, more broadly, to make contract the central principle
throughout consumer law.,1 41
138 See, e.g., Ex parte Smith, 736 So. 2d 604, 610 (Ala. 1999) ("Because of the
strong federal policy favoring arbitration, courts will not lightly infer a waiver of
arbitration rights.").
139 See, e.g., Williams v. Imhoff, 203 F.3d 758, 763, 767 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting
federal policy favoring arbitration and concluding that ERISA claims are arbitrable);
Jones v. Fujitsu Network Communications Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 688, 690, 695 (N.D. Tex.
1999) (noting federal policy favoring arbitration and concluding claims under Family and
Medical Leave Act are arbitrable).
140 Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HoFSTRA
L. REv. 83, 113-14 (1996) (quoting Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86
COLuM. L. REV. 269, 301 (1986)).
141 Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a
Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 195, 196 (1998).
"Anti-contract" is the phrase Professor Ware uses to describe measures designed to
protect consumers and others. The phrase includes mandatory disclosure provisions,
requirements that certain contracts be entered on a "knowing and voluntary" basis, as
well as rules that preclude the alienability of certain rights. Id. at 196, 206-17.
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Most courts have applied this general approach to contracts to arbitration
clauses. With very rare exception, courts do not currently require that
arbitration clauses be entered into knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently.1 42
In typical cases, courts do not even consider the fact that someone might
think such a strict requirement was applicable. Rather, such cases simply
apply standard "objective" rules for contract formation, holding that adhesive
contracts are valid, so long as they are not unconscionable, fraudulent,
obtained under duress, or otherwise invalid.143 As discussed below, such
courts then go on to compel arbitration in many circumstances that at least
raise a question as to the knowingness, voluntariness, and intelligence of the
waiver.144
C. Courts Interpreting Arbitration Clauses Frequently State That the
Non-Negotiability of the Waiver, the Fact That It Was Not Actually
Negotiated, Its Non-Conspicuousness, Disparity in Bargaining
Power Between the Parties, and the Lack of Business or
Professional Experience of the Party Opposing the Arbitration, Are
Not Sufficient to Void an Arbitration Clause
1. Non-Negotiability of the Arbitration Clause
Courts have repeatedly stated that the' mere fact that arbitration is
imposed through a contract of adhesion is not enough to void the clause.
They have, for example, upheld clauses imposed without negotiation on
mobile home purchasers, 145  investors, 146  employees, 147  consumers
142 See generally id. at 197 (stating "the contractual approach to arbitration law ...
has become the law of the land"). A few courts have applied a stricter standard for
claims brought under particular statutes. See id. at 196.
143 See, e.g., Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282,286-88 (9th Cir.
1988) (setting out objective theory of contract and holding securities customer was bound
by agreement to arbitrate, although broker made no effort to explain its meaning); Flynn
v. Aerchem, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1060, 1063 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (upholding
arbitration clause against claims of lack of voluntary and intelligent waiver and stating
"[flailing to understand what one agrees to in a contract is not a viable excuse for non-
performance").
144 See infra Part III.C.
145 See, e.g., Fleetwood Enter., Inc. v. Bruno, No. 1990912,2000 WL 1716975 (Ala.
Nov. 17, 2000) (enforcing arbitration clause signed by purchaser as part of transaction);
Exparte Smith 736 So. 2d 604, 612 (Ala. 1999) (upholding an arbitration clause that was
imposed on a purchaser of a mobile home through the financing documents used in
connection with the sale, and observing that the mere facts that the agreement was not
negotiable, and that because purchaser was in a hurry to get elsewhere he did not read the
contract, did not mean the agreement should be voided as unconscionable). But see
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contracting for termite extermination services, 148 automobile purchasers, 149
investors, 150 and non-commercial borrowers. 15 1
2. Conspicuousness of the Arbitration Clause
Arbitration clauses need not be particularly clear or conspicuous to be
enforced. Rather, courts have demonstrated a willingness to uphold
arbitration clauses written in small type, buried in the midst of long
Pitchford v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 958 (W.D. Vir. 2000)
(invalidating arbitration clause imposed on mobile home purchaser on ground that it was
precluded by Magnuson Moss Act).
146 See, e.g., Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 286 (9th Cir.
1988) (upholding arbitration clause imposed on securities investors though it was a
contract of adhesion).
147 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991)
(stating "[m]ere inequality in bargaining power.., is not a sufficient reason to hold that
arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context"); 24 Hour
Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 533, 540-41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (even
assuming that employee could show that arbitration clause was presented to her as part of
a standardized contract, imposed by a party of superior strength, such showing would not
invalidate arbitration clause unless it could also be shown to be substantively
unconscionable).
148 See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995)
(holding FAA preempted Alabama statute that would have voided form mandatory
arbitration clause used by pest exterminator); Morris v. Terminix Services, Inc., No.
1990485, 2000 WL 1603657, at *1-3 (Ala. Oct. 27, 2000) (holding that adhesive
arbitration agreement between termite extermination company and home owners covered
events which transpired prior to when it was entered into).
149 See, e.g., Capitol Chevrolet & Imports, Inc. v. Grantham, No. 1990404, 2000
WL 1716976 (Ala. Nov. 17, 2000) (upholding form arbitration clause imposed on
purchaser of new automobile).
150 See, e.g., Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 286 (9th
Cir. 1988)( upholding arbitration clause imposed on securities investors though it
was a contract of adhesion).
151 See, e.g., Wirdzek v. Monetary Mgmt. of Calif., Inc., No. CV-F-99-5415-REC-
IJO, 1999 WL 688100, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 25, 1999) (stating that person who entered
series of "payday loan" contracts would be required to arbitrate dispute, where last
contract included arbitration clause, "[e]ven if Plaintiff did not have a meaningful choice
about whether to accept the arbitration provision ...."); Smith v. Equifirst Corp., 117 F.
Supp. 2d 557, 564 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (upholding arbitration clause imposed on
mortgagors that was allegedly "hidden in large stack of documents"); Commercial Credit
Corp. v. Leggett, 744 So. 2d 890, 891-93 (Ala. 1999) (upholding arbitration clause
contained in documents issued to low income single mother, in connection with loan for
$1,900, although borrower stated that no one explained to her what arbitration was or that
she would be waiving her jury trial right, that she never understood the agreement, and
that she would not have agreed to it had she understood).
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documents, and not identified by special bold or capital letters. 152 They have
also enforced arbitration agreements when. the document signed did not refer
to arbitration, but merely incorporated by reference another document that
called for arbitration. 153 Courts have even permitted arbitration to be imposed
retroactively, where a person agreed to be bound by certain rules that were
ultimately amended to call for arbitration, 154 or where only the most recent in
152 See, e.g., Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 176-77, 182-84 (3d
Cir. 1999) (upholding enforceability of arbitration clause contained in small print, on the
back and near the bottom of a form contract employed as part of a secondary mortgage
contract allegedly used as part of a scheme to defraud elderly, unsophisticated low and
middle income home owners); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-50 (7th
Cir. 1997) (upholding validity of arbitration clauise contained in small print in warranty
booklet shipped to customer with computer, together with many other peripherals and
explanatory booklets); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 834-35 (8th
Cir. 1997) (enforcing arbitration agreement that appeared on page thirty-one of employee
handbook); Blount v. Nat'l Lending Corp., 108 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669-70 (S.D. Miss.
2000) (upholding arbitration clause imposed on residential mortgagors, though plaintiffs
contended they "lacked knowledge of it,. . . did not voluntarily enter into it, it was
inconspicuous because it was 'hidden in a large stack of documents .unfamiliar to
Plaintiffs,'. . . they had no opportunity to study the agreement, [and] they were presented
with the agreement on a 'take it or leave it basis,"' where court emphasized agreement
was contained in a separate document and signed by each plaintiff); Meyers v. Univest
Home Loan, Inc., No. C-93-1783 MHP, 1993 WL 307747, at *3--=5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4,
1993) (concluding that consumers who obtained home loans were bound by arbitration
clause contained in financing documents, even assuming that the form was "buried"
among many documents, though none of the plaintiffs could recall reading or hearing
about the agreement, and although none were even aware of arbitration as a method of
dispute resolution, prior to this litigation). Cf. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517
U.S. 681 (1996) (holding that Montana statute requiring that certain type of notice be
afforded as to existence of arbitration provision was preempted by FAA).
153 See, e.g., R.J. O'Brien & Assoc. Inc. v. Pipkin, 64 F.3d 257, 260 (7th Cir. 1995)
("[Tihe NFA and CFTC forms do not specifically mention arbitration. A contract,
however, need not contain an explicit arbitration clause if it validly incorporates by
reference an arbitration clause in another document."). Bakula v.'Schumacher Homes,
Inc., No. 2000-6-2272, 2001 WL 179827 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2001) (finding
homeowners required to arbitrate where purchase contract mentioned warranty, and
where New Home Owner Manual subsequently sent to homeowners included arbitration
clause as well as limited warranty).
154 See, e.g., Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316, 320 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
that employee who had agreed to be bound by NASD rules "as may be amended from
time to time" could be required to take employment discrimination claim to arbitration,
even though NASD rules did not call for such arbitration at the time employee agreed to
be bound by them). But see Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 749 A.2d 405, 413-
15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (holding employee who signed arbitration agreement
did not knowingly and voluntarily waive right to jury trial on statutory claim because, at
time of signature, statute did not provide forjury trial).
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a series of contracts calls for arbitration. 155 In addition, one court found an
employee was bound by the terms of the employer's arbitration program
where the employee admitted receiving only a letter generally mentioning the
program and received nothing describing it in detail or providing its terms. 156
Nor have courts required that clauses explain the nature of binding
arbitration, nor even that they explain arbitration means that parties are
giving up their right to go to court and present their claims to a jury.157
Although this law professor has found that law students and even lawyers
may not realize that an agreement to binding arbitration waives all rights to
present claims in court, courts have often held that lay persons can be
assumed to have that knowledge. 158
155 See, e.g., Morris v. Terminix Services, Inc., No. 1990485, 2000 WL 1603657, at
*1-3 (Ala. Oct. 27, 2000) (interpreting federal policy favoring arbitration to "mandate
that a court give the broadest possible interpretation to an arbitration agreement and
resolve all doubts in favor of arbitration," and therefore holding that arbitration
agreement covered events which transpired prior to when it was entered into); Wirdzek,
1999 WL 688100, at *1-2 (holding that plaintiff who entered into a series of eight
"payday loan" contracts would be required to arbitrate disputes arising out of prior
events, and noting that plaintiffs attorney did not contest this point).
156 Cole v. Halliburton Co., No. CIV-00-0862-T, 2000 WL 1531614 at *1-2 (W.D.
Okla. Sept. 6, 2000). The company also argued that it was appropriate to assume the
employee received the more complete mailings, because the company had evidence
showing they were mailed and not returned, and the employee had no sufficient evidence
to rebut that evidence. Id. at *2-3.
157 See, e.g., McCarthy v. Providential Corp., No. C94-0627 FMS, 1994 WL 387852
(N.D. Cal. July 19, 1994) (holding plaintiffs, senior citizens who had entered into
"reverse mortgage loans" providing them with cash in exchange for equity in their home,
were bound by arbitration clause contained in deeds of trust). The court explained:
Contrary to [the] plaintiffs' assertions, it does not take a 'clairvoyant' to understand
the meaning of [the] clause. Regrettably, [the] plaintiffs' assumption of loans
without understanding all of the terms of the contract may represent the norm and
not the exception. This failure to inquire however, will not shield them from
obligations clearly and explicitly contained in the agreement.
Id. at *5. See also Adams v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 888 F.2d 696, 701
(10th Cir. 1989) (finding no fraud in broker's failure to verbally disclose arbitration
provision to customers because "law presumes that one has read that which he has
signed"); Rosen v. Waldman, No. 93-Civ. 225 (PKL), 1993 WL 403974, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 7, 1993) (requiring broker to explain or disclose arbitration clause to client "would
undermine the strong federal policy favoring arbitration").
158 In Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke Inc., 841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988) the court
held that plaintiffs, securities brokerage customers, would be bound by the arbitration
clause they had signed as part of the brokerage agreement, even though they claimed the
brokerage had misled them by failing to explicitly inform them of the clause or explain
its meaning. The court stated,
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In fact, far from requiring conspicuousness and clarity, a number of courts
have even upheld the imposition of arbitration where companies were said to
have verbally misled consumers or others regarding the provision. For
example, some courts have rejected fraud claims even though the company's
agent allegedly falsely stated that signing the clause would not compromise
any rights. 159 Other courts have enforced arbitration clauses even though
company representatives lulled consumers into signing the clauses by stating
they were mere formalities. 160
We know of no case holding that parties dealing at arm's length have a duty to
explain to each other the terms of a written contract. We decline to impose such an
obligation where the language of the contract clearly and explicitly provides for
arbitration ....
We see no unfairness in expecting parties to read contracts before they
sign them.
We are unable to understand how any person possessing a basic education
and fluent in the English language could fail to grasp the meaning of that provision.
Id. at 287-88 (citation omitted). See also Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742
F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[T]hough perhaps not contemplated by the [plaintiffs]
when they signed the contract, loss of the right to a jury trial is a necessary and fairly
obvious consequence of an agreement to arbitrate. The [plaintiffs] cannot use their
failure to inquire about the ramifications of that clause to avoid the consequences of
agreed-to arbitration."); Bakri v. Continental Airlines, Inc., No. CV 92-3476 SVW(k),
1992 WL 464125, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 1992) (upholding arbitration clause although
employee claimed not to understand the meaning of "final and binding" in that "[t]hese
words are both plain on their face and typical of arbitration clauses").
159 See, e.g., Cohen, 841 F.2d at 287 (stating that customer's reliance on false
statement was not reasonable, and thus not actionable, where customer could have
ascertained truth by carefully reading contract); Snap-on Tools Corp. v. Vetter, 838 F.
Supp. 468, 472 (D. Mont. 1993) (holding that franchisee could not complain of false
verbal statement given language in contract).
160 See, e.g., Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. DeFries, No. 94-Civ. 0020 (WK), 1994
WL 455178, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1994) (enforcing arbitration clause although
broker allegedly told customer it was a "mere formality"); Benoay v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
699 F. Supp. 1523, 1529 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (upholding clause, where agent informed
customer that clause was a mere formality, reasoning that "[a] party who signs an
instrument is presumed to know its contents"). See also Houlihan v. Offerman & Co., 31
F.3d 692, 694 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding clause signed by securities customer even
though company sent it with letter implying it was similar to agreement the customer had
already signed and should be signed again as mere updating formality required by federal
agencies); Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Barger, 773 So. 2d 454, 459-61 (Ala. 2000)
(upholding arbitration imposed on mobile home purchaser, although salesmen
purportedly represented documents containing arbitration clause as being "for insurance
purposes"). But see Thermo-sav, Inc. v. Bozeman, No. 1991106, 2000 WL 1603654
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3. Relative Bargaining Power of the Parties
Courts have frequently upheld arbitration clauses despite vast differences
in the bargaining power of the parties. Notwithstanding claims of disparate
power, they have frequently allowed companies to impose arbitration on their
employees, 161 lenders to impose arbitration on borrowers, 162 large companies
to impose arbitration on purchasers of their products, 163 or services, 164 and
franchisors to impose arbitration on franchisees. 165
(Ala. Oct. 27, 2000) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause contained on reverse side of
contract, where contractor failed to inform customer that back side contained additional
terms, where signature was on front, and where contract was attached to a clipboard, with
only the front showing).
161 In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), the Court stated
"[m]ere inequality in bargaining power . . . is not a sufficient reason to hold that
arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context," while
recognizing that agreements could be voided where there was a showing of "the sort of
fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation
of any contract'." Id. at 33. It found no substantial inequality of bargaining power where
the plaintiff, Gilmer, was "an experienced businessman." Id. See also Flynn v. Aerchem,
Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1061-62 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (upholding arbitration clause
although plaintiff stated that if she signed the clause, she did so under economic duress,
in that her finances were unstable as she was in the midst of a divorce, and observing that
disparity in bargaining power was not great enough to void clause because employee
possessed the power to quit her job); McNaughton v. United Healthcare Services, Inc.,
728 So. 2d 592, 596-98 (Ala. 1998) (stating arbitration clause imposed on employee by
employer is not void either because it was a contract of adhesion or because there was an
inequality of bargaining power).
162 Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 176, 182-83 (3d Cir. 1999)
(rejecting claim of unconscionability made by couple allegedly targeted in scheme to take
advantage of "relatively unsophisticated, low-to middle-income, senior citizens," and
concluding that combination of imbalance of power and inconspicuousness of clause
were not sufficient to show procedural unconscionability); Pridgen v. Green Tree Fin.
Servicing Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 655, 657-58 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (rejecting mobile home
purchaser's argument that arbitration clause contained in financing documents was
procedurally unconscionable because borrower is "an unsophisticated consumer
purchaser," lender is "a sophisticated corporate lender," terms were complex, and contract
was adhesive and buried in body of contract in fine print, and reasoning that clause was
last paragraph of contract, located above space where plaintiff signed).
163 See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000 Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1050-51 (7th Cir. 1997)
(holding customer bound by arbitration clause contained in limited warranty booklet
shipped with computer).
164 See, e.g., Sankey v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1298-99
(M.D. Ala. 2000) (upholding arbitration clause imposed on customer by pest
extermination provider, even though customer "undoubtedly had weaker bargaining
power and probably had little choice in the inclusion of the arbitration clause in the
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4. Business or Professional Experience and Sophistication of the
Party Opposing Arbitration
Courts have repeatedly stated that they will not void mandatory
arbitration clauses merely because they are applied to persons who are
elderly, read poorly, or are otherwise unsophisticated. 166 For example, in Ex
parte Napier,167 the Alabama Supreme Court upheld an arbitration clause
that was included as paragraph twenty-one in the financing documents
connected to the purchasers of a $37,028 mobile home. 168 One of the
purchasers "testified that she was 77 years old, did not finish high school,
had poor eyesight, had difficulty reading, and could not read small print."'169
The other purchaser, her brother, "was 72 years old, did not finish high
school, and had difficulty reading."'170 Nonetheless, the court found the
siblings had failed to present sufficient evidence to void the clause on
grounds of unconscionability. 171  Other courts have issued similar
decisions. 172
Agreement"); Parsley v. Terminix Int'l Co., No. C-3-97-394, 1998 WL 1572764, at *5
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 15, 1998) (enforcing arbitration clause contained in pest extermination
contract, although the company drafted the contract and had greater bargaining power,
and also accepting that plaintiff was an older woman who lacked experience in such
transactions).
165 See, e.g., KKW Enter., Inc. v. Gloria Jean's Gourmet Coffees Franchising Corp.,
184 F.3d 42, 49-52 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that state law prohibiting use of forum
selection clause in franchise agreement was preempted, when included with arbitration
clause).
166 But see Penn v. Ryan's Family Steakhouses, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 940, 954-55
(N.D. Ind. 2000) (concluding that agreement to arbitrate must be "knowing and
voluntary" to comply with ADA, and further stating that "[tihis court is hard-pressed to
believe that the average job applicant at Ryan's competing for a job washing dishes or
waiting tables could possibly pick-up on the intricacies of the Agreement and understand
the contractual scenario involved, and then boldly pose questions to the manager
conducting his or her interview or consult an attorney before signing").
167 Exparte Napier, 723 So. 2d 49,50 (Ala. 1998).
168 Id.
169 Id. at 52.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 52-53. As will be discussed elsewhere, infra at note 184, this opinion also
placed the burden of proving invalidity on the parties opposing the clause, and held that
relying on the Alabama state constitution to shift this burden of proof would violate the
preemption principles of Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
172 See, e.g., Mitchell Nissan, Inc. v. Foster, No. 1982183, 2000 WL 804452 *3
(Ala. June 23, 2000) (concluding man who only read at sixth grade level was bound by
arbitration clause contained in document connected to purchase of new car); Results
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D. Numerous Courts Have Upheld Arbitration Clauses Imposed
Through Unsigned, Uninitialed Clauses
Many companies have begun to impose arbitration through clauses that
are neither signed nor initialed, and courts do not generally find such contracts
impermissible, unless they are problematic for other reasons. 173 Significantly,
the Federal Arbitration Act does not require that arbitration clauses be signed
or initialled, but only that they be written. 174
For example, in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,175 the Seventh Circuit
upheld an arbitration clause that was contained in a warranty booklet sent to
the customer with his computer. Although neither a signature nor initials
were asked for or obtained, the court found the clause enforceable on the
ground that the consumer could have read it and avoided it by sending back
the computer within thirty days. 176
Oriented, Inc. v. Crawford, 538 S.E.2d 73, 75-79 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding
mandatory arbitration clause imposed on mobile home purchaser, although purchaser
stated he was not a sophisticated businessman, that paperwork was approximately 1 inch
thick, and that salesman stated "its [sic] just standard documents," where court
emphasized purchasei had simply failed to read documents, and that plaintiff did not
show he was prevented from reading the documents); Parsley v. Terminix Int'l Co., No.
C-3-97-394, 1998 WL 1572764, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 15, 1998) (enforcing arbitration
clause contained in contract of adhesion imposed on purchaser of termite extermination
services, even assuming plaintiff was "a sixty-three year old woman with little education
and little or no experience in similar transactions").
173 There are some significant recent exceptions. See e.g., Long v. Fidelity Water
Systems, Inc., No. C-97-20118 R.M.W., 2000 WL 989914, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 26,
2000) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause contained in modification to credit card
agreement); Walker v. Air Liquide Am. Corp., 113 F. Supp. 2d 983, 985-86 (M.D. La.
2000) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause contained in employee handbook, even
though employee signed acknowledgment of receipt, and reasoning that acknowledgment
was not sufficient to constitute written acceptance of arbitration provision); Union
Planters Bank, N.A. v. Watson, No. CV-98-2453, 2000 WL 1841875, at *3 (Ala. Dec.
15, 2000) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause contained in subsequent mailing done by
bank, where customers had not signed new signature cards); S. Energy Homes, Inc. v.
Hennis, No. 1982118, 2000 WL 1074048, at *2, 3 (Ala. Aug. 4, 2000) (refusing to
enforce arbitration clause allegedly contained in mobile home owner's manual on ground
that seller had not adequately proven claus was in manual, and observing in dicta that
mere inclusion in manual is insufficient to show buyer's consent to clause).
174 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
175 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
176 Id. at 1148-49. A state court upheld an insuror's imposition of binding
arbitration on the insured, even though the insureds received a copy of the policy
containing the clause only after the premiums had been paid and coverage had begun.
Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 565 A.2d 908 (Del. 1989). Cf S. Energy
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Similarly, numerous credit card companies and banks have begun
imposing arbitration by sending their customers envelope stuffers, with their
monthly statements,* that state that all future disputes must be arbitrated rather
than resolved through litigation. 177  Several courts have accepted that
arbitration can be imposed in this fashion. 178
Employers are increasingly using handbooks to impose binding arbitration
on their employees. While some employers require the employee to sign
something acknowledging receipt of the entire handbook, not all require
employees to sign or initial the arbitration clause in particular. Numerous
courts have enforced arbitration, because it is called for in an employee
handbook, not only where the employees sign an acknowledgment, 179 but also
Homes, Inc. v. Harcus, 754 So. 2d 622, 623-26 (Ala. 1999) (remanding suit to trial court,
for determination as to whether arbitration agreement had been entered, where defendant
had included arbitration clause in Home Owner's Manual placed in kitchen drawer in
mobile home, and where defendant claimed mobile home purchasers had accepted
arbitration by accepting services provided pursuant to the written warranty). For some
contrary cases, see supra note 173.
177 Such clauses have for example recently been issued by Citibank, First USA,
MBNA, American Express, and J.C. Penney & Monogram Credit Card Bank of Georgia.
(Clauses on file with author).
178 See, e.g., Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (S.D.
Miss 2000) (permitting bank to impose arbitration by mailing clause to customers,
although customers did not sign any document); Bank One, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F. Supp.
2d 819 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (imposing arbitration though change of terms notice was not
fraudulent, unconscionable, or in violation of the Seventh Amendment). See also
Goetsch v. Shell Oil Co., 197 F.R.D. 574 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (holding credit card holder
barred from proceeding by class action, in arbitration, although card holder denied having
received mailing prohibiting class actions, because "a letter properly addressed, stamped,
and mailed may be presumed to have been received by addressee in the due course of
mail"); Marsh v. First USA Bank, 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 926 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (holding
imposition of arbitration clause through change of terms notice provided adequate notice,
was not unconscionable, and also did not violate Seventh Amendment). Cf. Badie v.
Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 287 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (refusing to enforce
arbitration clause contained in change of terms "bill stuffer" provided to customers and
credit card holders by bank, on ground that waiver was not sufficiently clear, but
implying that clear waiver might have been enforceable).
179 See, e.g., Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1997)
(upholding arbitration clause contained in employee handbook, even though handbooks
are not considered contracts, where clause was said to be separate and distinct from rest
of handbook, was set forth on a different page and introduced by bold type, had to be
signed by the employee, and used a different tone and language than the rest of the
handbook); Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 84 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1733 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 21, 2000) (upholding clause contained in handbook, where employee signed
acknowledgement she had read that part of the handbook); Towles v. United Healthcare
Corp., 524 S.E.2d 839, 845-46 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that employee agreed to
binding arbitration by signing a Code of Conduct and Employee Handbook
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where they do not. 180 In one extreme case, a court even held that employees
could be bound by an arbitration clause they denied receiving, where the
company could at most prove that the memoranda containing the clause were
sent, and not that they were definitely received by the employees. 181
E. Courts Generally Hold That the Party Opposing Arbitration Bears
the Burden of Proof to Establish That the Clause Is Invalid Under a
Federal Statute or Standard Contract Law Principles
Courts agree that the opponent of an arbitration clause bears the burden of
showing that the clause is inconsistent with federal law or invalid as a matter
of contract law. For example, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,182
the Supreme Court stated "the burden is on Gilmer [the plaintiff/employee] to
show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial forum for ADEA
claims." 183 Numerous lower courts have also held that it is up to the party
Acknowledgment form, where clause stated that only arbitration portion of handbook is
contract, and that employee accepted offer by continuing in his employment).
180 See, e.g., McClendon v. Sherwin Williams, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 940, 942-43
(E.D. Ark. 1999) (holding binding arbitration clause contained in handbook distributed to
employees was valid, even though it was not particularly explicit, because plaintiff
accepted the offer of binding arbitration by remaining an employee); In re Alamo
Lumber Co., 23 S.W.3d 577, 580-81 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding employees were
bound by arbitration clause contained in employment policy where they continued to
work after receiving copy of policy containing clause.) However, few courts have also
refused to enforce handbook provisions and other unsigned contracts. See supra note
173.
181 See, e.g., Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 818, 820-21 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding employee was bound by arbitration clause contained in documents
company's evidence showed were mailed to employee and not returned, even though
employee stated she never received the documents, and company had no signed
acknowledgment proving that employee had in fact received the materials). In a similar
case, a federal district court in Texas held that credit card holders would be bound by the
arbitration clause contained in a change in terms notice customers denied receiving.
Marsh, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 916-19 (finding that because company had met its burden of
showing amendment was mailed, customers must now prove non-receipt, and that their
affidavits were insufficient evidence of non-receipt). See also Cole v. Halliburton Co.,
No. CIV-00-0862-T, 2000 WL 1531614, at *2-3 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 6, 2000) (holding
employee was bound by arbitration program described in materials purportedly mailed to
his home by company, where company presented records of professional mailing service
showing documents were sent to employee's house and not returned, and where employee
admitted receiving two documents discussing program albeit not describing it in detail).
These decisions raise a serious question of how a consumer or employee could ever prove
they did not receive the amendment the company claimed to have mailed.
182 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
183 Id.
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challenging the arbitration clause to meet the burden of showing that it is
unconscionable or otherwise void under contract law.' 84 A few courts have
even held that once a company presents evidence showing, that it mailed
material containing an arbitration clause to an employee or consumer, the
alleged recipient bears the burden of proving that in fact she did riot receive
the documents. 185
F. Many Courts Have Held That Arbitration Clauses Should Be
Broadly Construed, to Support the Federal Policy "Favoring"
Arbitration
In determining the scope of the arbitration clause, many courts have held
that the federal policy favoring arbitration means that the courts should
interpret the scope of the clause broadly, to cover all claims that are
conceivably covered by that clause. For example, in Ann o v. Prudential
Insurance Co. of America,186 the Tenth Circuit foufid that although it was not
clear whether or not brokerage employees had consented to arbitrate their
employment claims, the federal policy favoring arbitration meant that the
clause must be given its broadest possible interpretation. The court
explained: "Notwithstanding the ambiguity... (or perhaps more correctly,
because of such ambiguity), we conclude that the most appropriate
184 See, e.g., Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999)
(stating, in upholding arbitration clause, that "[tihe party challenging a contract provision
as unconscionable generally bears the burden of proving unconscionability"); Ex parte
Napier, 723 So. 2d 49, 53 (Ala. 1998) ("Under general principles of law, the party
asserting the defense of unconscionability has the burden of proving unconscionability.
If we shifted the burden of proof on the issue of unconscionability, because of the
implications arising from alleged violations of the Alabama Constitution, then we would
violate the principles of Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681
(1996)....").
185 See, e.g., Marsh v. First USA Bank, 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 916-19 (N.D. Tex.
2000) (finding that because company had met its burden of showing amendment was
mailed, customers must now prove non-receipt, and that their affidavits were insufficient
evidence); Craig, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 821 (stating that once company produced evidence
that it mailed documents containing details of arbitration program to employee, employee
bore burden of showing that in fact the documents never arrived). See also Cole, 2000
WL 1531614, at *2 (stating that "[a] rebuttable presumption of delivery may be proved
by circumstantial evidence, including the mailing practices utilized," and that it was
appropriate to use this presumption to show that an employee received sufficient notice
of employer's mandatory arbitration program).186 Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 72 F.3d 793 (10th Cir. 1995).
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construction . . . is to apply [the] arbitration provisions to employment
disputes ... ."187
G. Summary on Interpretation of Contractual Arbitration Clauses
The contrast between the jury trial waiver cases and the arbitration cases
is stark. As shown above, although clauses mandating arbitration inherently
eliminate the jury trial, courts are not applying the jury trial waiver analysis
in the arbitration context. Instead of demonstrating a reluctance to find
waiver of a jury trial, courts chant the mantra that arbitration is favored.
Rather than using the knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver standard,
most courts interpreting arbitration clauses look only at whether, according to
traditional objective contract principles, the contract includes an arbitration
provision. The degree of conspicuousness, negotiability, bargaining power
disparity, and other individualized factors are not typically deemed important
in arbitration. In addition, the burden of proof is often placed on the party
opposing arbitration, rather than on the party defending the waiver.
Uninitialed, unsigned waivers that probably would not be found to be
knowing, voluntary and intelligent are nonetheless often found sufficient
modes of imposing arbitration. Finally, whereas courts interpret jury trial
waivers narrowly, they often interpret arbitration clauses broadly. In fact,
rather than demanding a higher level of consent for arbitration clauses than
for other contracts, some courts are even requiring a lower level of consent,
citing the supposed federal policy favoring arbitration. 188
187 Id. at 798. See also Am. Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal Imaging,
Inc., 96 F.3d 88, 92-93 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that requests for arbitration may not be
denied "unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute"); Webb v. Investacorp,
Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 259 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that although clause "could have been
drafted with more precision," the federal policy favoring arbitration required that it be
interpreted broadly); Gregory v. Electro-Mechanical Corp., 83 F.3d 382, 384 (11th Cir.
1996) (interpreting clause broadly).
188 See, e.g., Harris, 183 F.3d at 182 (finding inapplicable state cases providing
"support for certain claims of procedural unconscionability that are based on
inconspicuous or unclear contractual language, in particular, if the contracting parties
have unequal bargaining power," because "[t]hese cases do not, however, concern
arbitration clauses and are, therefore, inapposite to this case").
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IV. How COURTS Do AND SHOULD RECONCILE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
JuRY TRIAL WArVER STANDARDS wrrH ENFORCEMENT OF
MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES
A. Lack of Attention and Divergent Results
As has been noted, the dichotomy between the jury trial waiver and
arbitration clause standards has received very little attention from either
courts or commentators. 189 Mandatory arbitration clauses are frequently
attacked on grounds such as unconscionability, or violation of a federal
statute, but much less often on the ground that they violate the Seventh
Amendment.
A few cases do draw on jury trial concerns to void arbitration clauses.
This Author has located just one opinion in which a federal court refused to
enforce a contractual arbitration clause on the ground that it violated the
Seventh Amendment. In an unpublished decision from the bench, ultimately
reversed in an unpublished court of appeals decision, a judge in the Eastern
District of Virginia held that a contractual arbitration clause was
unenforceable "because the plaintiffs ... did not knowingly and voluntarily
waive their rights to a jury trial." 190 In a related but not directly on-point
decision, another federal court, addressing a statutory rather than a
contractual imposition of arbitration, ruled that a Minnesota statute that
required a foreign corporation to submit to binding arbitration deprived the
corporation" of its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on various
189 For exceptions among commentators, see Reuben, supra note 4, at 1019-34
(discussing standard that should be used [under Constitution] to judge legitimacy of
arbitration clause); Stemlight, supra note 40, at 56-69. See also Richard E. Speidel,
Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither Consent?, 62 BROOK. L. REV.
1335, 1352 n.63 (1996) ("Outside of the arbitration context, courts require a 'knowing
and intentional' waiver of the right to a jury trial. Relevant factors include the clarity and
prominence with which the language is expressed, the sophistication of the parties,
whether or not they are represented by counsel, and their relative bargaining power.");
Ware, supra note 141, at 216-17 (recognizing thatthe Supreme Court has not directly
addressed the jury trial argument, but arguing that acceptance of the argument would
require reversal of Supreme Court cases implementing the "contractual approach").
190 Sydnor v. AAPCO of Richmond West, No. 3:00 CV 396 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27,
2000) (transcript of opinion issued from bench on file with author), rev'd, Sydnor v.
Conseco Fin. Serv. Corp., 2001 WL 223243, at *8 (4th Cir. Mar. 7, 2001) (per curiam)
(stating that parties signed a clause stating they voluntarily and knowingly waived their
jury trial rights, and rejecting argument that waiver of jury trial calls for a more
demanding standard).
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claims. 191 Several other federal courts have addressed the issue in dicta.
Most notably, a bankruptcy court discussed the conflict between jury trial
rights and mandatory arbitration at great length, and using extremely colorful
language. For example, the court stated, "The reality that the average
consumer frequently loses his/her constitutional rights and right of access to
the court when he/she buys a car, household appliance, insurance policy,
receives medical attention or gets a job rises as a putrid odor which is
overwhelming to the body politic."' 92 Contrasting the situation when two
equally sophisticated parties bargain at arms length to resolve disputes
through arbitration, to the situation when companies impose such arbitration
on consumers on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis, 193 the court stated that "I would
hold that in a consumer-transaction case involving a contract containing an
arbitration provision, unless there is a showing that the consumer entered the
arbitration agreement voluntarily, the contract will be unenforceable as an
encroachment on the fight to trial by jury."194 The court nonetheless failed to
void the agreement in dispute on that basis because plaintiff had failed to
request a jury trial in his complaint. 195 Yet another district court mentioned
the Seventh Amendment, and noted that it might be applicable, but ultimately
voided the clause on other grounds. 196 Finally, several state courts have
similarly drawn on a state constitutional right to a jury trial or to access to
191 See GTFM, LLC v. TKN Sales, Inc., No. 00CIV0235BSJ, 2000 WL 364871, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2000) (noting that the company did not consent to the arbitration).
192 In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999).
193 Id. at 829. The court explained that whereas the Federal Arbitration Act was
passed to permit merchants to adopt arbitration that they both found desirable, it is now
being imposed on consumers who have no choice but to "give up constitutional rights
long held precious to Western legal systems or give up access to the marketplace." Id. at
828. As to this shift in the usage of the FAA, the court provided a metaphor that will be
meaningful to all those who have lived in the southeastern United States: "When
introduced as a method to control soil erosion, kudzu was hailed as an asset to
agriculture, but it has become a creeping monster. Arbitration was innocuous when
limited to negotiated commercial contracts, but it developed sinister characteristics when
it became ubiquitous." Id.
194 Id. at 830. The court explained that it would look to whether the consumer was
"apprised of his right to a trial by jury and ... given an opportunity to accept or reject
arbitration in a manner similar to the choice commonly given consumers either to
purchase or refuse credit life or disability insurance." Id.
195 Id. at 839-40.
196 Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 610-12 (D.S.C. 1998)
(voiding arbitration clause imposed on employee on various grounds, including that
clause was not accepted "knowingly and voluntarily," but resting this requirement on
Title VII rather than on the Seventh Amendment), affjd on other grounds, 173 F.3d 933
(4th Cir. 1999) (voiding clause on ground that company had breached agreement by
issuing other arbitration rules).
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court to either invalidate an arbitration provision,197 or to interpret such a
provision narrowly. 19 8
The vast majority of decisions, however, either entirely ignore the jury
trial waiver cases in interpreting arbitration clauses, or else conclude that the
jury trial doctrines are not relevant. For example, a few courts have
recognized that a contract to arbitrate waives the jury trial right, but have not
then explained their failure to apply the traditional jury trial waiver criteria to
determine whether or not a waiver should be found.19 9 In one such case,
197 Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 289-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(drawing on right to jury trial, under California constitution, to conclude that bank
customers, who were sent envelope stuffer "change in terms notice" calling for
arbitration, did not agree to arbitration because waiver was not unambiguous and
unequivocal). The court explained,
We find no unambiguous and unequivocal waiver of the right to a jury trial either in
the language of the change of terms provision or in any other part of the original
account agreements. Nor do we find an unambiguous and unequivocal waiver in
any customer's failure to close or stop using an account immediately after receiving
the "bill stuffers" because, as even the trial court concluded, the notice contained in
the "bill stuffer" was "not designed to achieve 'knowing consent!" to the ADR
provision .... The wording of the "bill stuffer" itself is far from the direct, clear and
unambiguous language required to alert a customer that by maintaining the status
quo he or she is waiving an important constitutional right.
Id. at 290-91. See also Villa Milano Homeowvners Ass'n v. II Davorge, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d
1, 7 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2000) (mentioning jur trial ight in refusing to enforce arbitration
clause that was buried deep in restrictive covenants used by developer to protect against
claims by home owners); Allstar Homes, Inc. v. Waters, 711 So. 2d 924, 929 (Ala. 1997)
(remanding question of validity of arbitration clause to trial court and observing, "[w]e
must emphasize that any arbitration agreement is a waiver of a party's right under
Amendment VII of the United States Constitution to a trial by jury and, regardless of the
federal courts' policy favoring arbitration, wd find nothing in the FAA that would permit
such a waiver unless it is made knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily"); Broemmer v.
Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc) (holding
agreement to arbitrate medical malpractice claim unenforceable, and observing "there
was no conspicuous or explicit waiver of the fundamental right to a jury trial or any
evidence that such rights were knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived"). Note
that the Alabama Supreme Court did not explain why the federal right to a jury trial,
rather than any state constitutional right, would apply to an action brought in state court.
198 Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 642 (Fla. 1999) (taking note of
"right to trial by jury" in concluding that arbitration clause between home owner and
building contractor should be narrowly construed so that it did not cover tort claim
brought against contractor).
199 E.g., Dillard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce; Fenner & Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148,
1155 n.12 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting plaintiffs claim that he was denied Seventh
Amendment right when he was compelled to arbitrate, stating "the Seventh Amendment
does not preclude 'waiver' of the right to jury trial through the signing of a valid
arbitration agreement", but failing to apply standard waiver analysis); United States v.
Am. Soc'y of Composers, 708 F. Supp. 95, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (rejecting jury trial claim
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Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Vintson,200 the Alabama Supreme Court
observed that mobile home purchasers Johnny and Bonnie Vintson argued
that "they did not knowingly, willingly, or voluntarily agree to waive their
right to a jury trial." 201 However, without discussing the argument in depth,
the court simply rejected it on the ground that competent adults having the
ability to read and understand contracts are normally held to have done so,
when they signed the agreement.202 Yet, the court did not consider whether a
higher standard of knowingness and voluntariness is required for waiver of a
constitutional right, as discussed earlier.203 In a subsequent decision the
Alabama Supreme Court purported to examine whether the plaintiff mobile
home purchaser "knowingly, voluntarily, and willingly waived his right to a
jury trial" by agreeing to arbitration, but upheld a waiver that most courts
would likely have rejected, using the traditional jury waiver test.204 Some
courts have stated, without extensive analysis, that they need not employ the
traditional waiver standard because arbitration is "favored," under federal
law.205 As one district court explained,
in part because petitioner supposedly agreed to arbitration process when he joined
Society of Composers, but failing to consider whether this was knowing, voluntary,
intelligent waiver). See also Sydnor v. Conseco Fin. Serv. Corp., 2001 WL 223243, at *3
(4th Cir. Mar. 7, 2001) (per curiam) (finding jury trial right was waived, through
signature of document, but failing to explain non-applicability of traditional waiver
analysis).
200 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Vintson, 753 So. 2d 497 (Ala. 1999).
201 Id. at 502. The right asserted presumably arose under the Alabama rather than
the U.S. Constitution, as the suit was brought in state rather than federal court.
202 Id.
203 As was noted above, this higher standard would apply only if, as I argue, the
provisions of the general Alabama constitution are not preempted by the FAA. See supra
note 8.
204 Johnnie's Homes, Inc. v. Holt, No. 1991404, 2001 WL 29263, at *4 (Ala. Jan.
12, 2001) (holding illiterate mobile home purchaser with sixth grade education
knowingly, voluntarily, and willingly waived right to jury trial in signing contract
containing arbitration provision, although he claimed he was not even given arbitration
provision nor notified that contract contained such a provision).
205 See, e.g., Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 285, 287 (9th
Cir. 1988) (stating arbitration is favored and further stating that issue of whether there
was a knowing and intelligent waiver "is simply beside the point"); Pierson v. Dean,
Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 337, 339 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting arbitration is
favored and explaining that "though perhaps not contemplated by the Piersons when they
signed the contract, loss of the right to a jury trial is a necessary and fairly obvious
consequence of an agreement to arbitrate"); Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, No. 00-3865,
2000 WL 1728503, at *4, 7 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2000) (stating that arbitration is favored
and concluding employee waived jury trial right by signing acknowledgement of receipt
of handbook calling for arbitration, but failing to apply traditional test for waiver);
Bosinger v. Phillips Plastics Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989-90 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
[Vol. 16:3 2001]
THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
Supreme Court precedent indicates that the Seventh Amendment does not
present a serious obstacle to arbitrati6n. In fact, that precedent makes clear
that arbitration clauses are to be broadly construed and doubts are to be
resolved in favor of arbitration.... If the Seventh Amendment presented a
serious limitation on the duty to arbitrate, arbitration provisions would have
to be narrowly construed.
206
Yet such courts fail to address the possible invalidity of a federal law that is
inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution.20 7 In contrast, as will be discussed in
detail, a few courts, led by the Seventh Circuit, have purported to solve the
conflict, asserting that by "agreeing" to arbitrate, persons agree to have their
dispute resolved in a non-Seventh Amendment forum, and that the court
therefore need not apply normal waiver criteria.20 8
Finally, in a most interesting but extremely odd turn of affairs, one court
and one commentator have suggested resolving the tension between the
tough standard protecting waiver of the jury trial and the more lax standard
for interpreting arbitration agreements by applying the more lax arbitration
standard to contractual jury trial waivers, thereby making it just as easy to
take away persons' jury trial rights outside the arbitration context as it has
become in the arbitration context. In enforcing a jury trial waiver in a non-
arbitration case the Connecticut Supreme Court stated as follows:
We begin by noting that jury trial waivers entered into in advance of
litigation are similar to arbitration agreements in that both involve the
relinquishment of the right to have a jury decide the facts of the case. We
have explicitly stated that "[a]rbitration affords a contractual remedy with a
view toward expediting disputes." (citation omitted) Arbitration is favored
because it is intended to avoid the formalities, delay, expense and vexation
of ordinary litigation. (citations omitted). Arbitration agreements illustrate
the strong public policy favoring freedom of contract and the efficient
(rejecting independent contractor's argument that although he signed agreement calling
for arbitration he did not knowingly waive jury trial right, and explaining that arbitration
is favored and that plaintiff failed to provide case law supporting his position that
agreement must be knowing); Parsley v. Terminix Int'l Co., No. C-3-97-394, 1998 WL
1572764, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 15, 1998) (mentioning that plaintiff asserted a jury trial
right but failing to apply Seventh Amendment standard and stating that Supreme Court
has mandated questions regarding enforceability of arbitration clauses be resolved in
favor of arbitration). See also Henry v. Gonzalez, 18 S.W.3d 684, 691 (Tex. App. 2000)
("[Plaintiffs] public policy contentions are unfounded because well established caselaw
favors mandatory arbitration and holds that arbitration does not deny parties their right to
ajury trial, as a matter of law.").
206 Burlington N.R.R. v. Soo Line R.R, 162 B.R. 207,214 (D. Minn. 1993).
207 See infra text accompanying notes 213-23.
208 See infra text accompanying notes 224-68.
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resolution of disputes. These policies are also furthered by a jury trial
waiver clause. 209
By contrast, the Missouri Supreme Court recognized that while freedom of
contract concerns might justify both arbitration and jury trial waivers, 210
"more than contract law is involved," 211 stating that "the validity of the [jury
trial] waiver here depends on whether the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily consented to relinquish her right to a jury trial."212
B. No Legitimate Rationale Justifies Sidestepping Traditional Analysis
in Arbitration Cases
How can this disparity between the jury trial waiver and arbitration
standards be justified? I argue it can not.
1. The Federal Policy "Favoring" Arbitration Cannot Contravene
a Federal Constitutional Right
As noted, several courts have stated that the "knowing, voluntary and
intelligent" Seventh Amendment waiver standard is inappropriate to
arbitration because the federal policy favoring arbitration compels them to
use the lower contract law standard.213  This is, quite simply, a non-
explanation, because the Constitution is the Supreme Law of the Land.214
209 L&R Realty v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 715 A.2d 748, 753 (Conn. 1998). See
also Edward Wood Dunham, Enforcing Contract Terms Designed to Manage Franchisor
Risk, 19 FRANCHISE L.J. 91, 98-99 (2000) (recognizing that, "[a]s a theoretical matter, the
elevated status of arbitration agreements is difficult to justify," but arguing that jury trial
waivers should be allowed according to the more liberal test afforded to arbitration
clauses).
210 In Malan Realty Investors, Inc. v. Harris, 953 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1997) (en banc),
the court took note of parties' interest in "freedom of contract" and stated,
Our courts have held that a party may contractually relinquish fundamental and due
process rights. Arbitration agreements are an example where the courts have upheld
the parties' right to contractually agree to relinquish substantial rights. In every
arbitration agreement, the parties not only agree to waive ajury trial but also to give
up their right to present their claim to any judicial tribunal deciding the case.
Id. at 626.
211 Id. at 627.
212 Id.
213 See supra text accompanying notes 205-07.
214 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803) ("If then the courts are to regard
the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the
constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.").
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The. Seventh Amendment jury trial right supercedes any policy emanating
from a federal statute.215
Moreover, although Professor Ware has asserted that recognizing the
relevance of the Seventh Amendment standard "would require reversal of
[Supreme Court] cases implementing the contractual approach, and would
require a holding that the FAA is unconstitutional insofar as it requires courts
to enforce arbitration agreements 'save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract,"' 216 this statement is too extreme.
Of course it is true that recognizing the applicability of the Seventh
Amendment would rein in some courts' enthusiasm for mandatory binding
arbitration. However, the Seventh Amendment, even where applicable, does
not void all aspects of the supposed federal policy favoring binding
arbitration.
Although Professor Ware has taken Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto2 17 to be "another ringing endorsement of the contractual approach
to arbitration," 218 its holding is far narrower and thus its reversal' would not
215 Moreover, it is not clear that any federal policy favors nonconsensual arbitration.
See Stemlight, supra note 3, at 660-63. See also Margaret M. Harding, The Redefinition
of Arbitration by Those with Superior Bargaining Power, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 857
(arbitration has been "distorted" and is now being used by powerful to secure advantages
over weak); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and 'Coercion
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REv. 931 (1999) (explaining that whereas
arbitration was originally espoused as a tool to be used voluntarily, between entities
sharing a community, it has now been expanded to cover situations including great power
disparities). Thus, it is arguable that if the Seventh Amendment test is used to determine
consent, the federal policy would not favor any arbitration clause that is not valid under
the Seventh Amendment.
216 Ware, Consumer Arbitration, supra note 141 at 217.
217 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
218 Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's Associates,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1001, 1001 (1996). See also Stephen J.
Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. .83, 137
(1996) (stating that "the Court's arbitration decisions over the last twenty years have been
remarkably faithful to the principle that courts should relegate claims to arbitration when,
and only when, contract law analysis would call for that). Some of the other cases relied
on by Professor Ware are Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 5i4 U.S. 52
(1995) (stating that parties can contract to allow arbitrator to award punitive damages);
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc., v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (holding that
consumer's agreement to arbitrate is enforceable, although void under state law, because
state law is preempted by the FAA); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20-23 (1991) (holding that employee's agreement to arbitrate claims under Age
Discrimination in Employment Act is not void under that statute); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v.
Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476-77 (1989) (holding that
parties could choose, in their contract, to be bound by state rather than federal arbitration
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be required. Casarotto holds only that a state statute that is targeted
specifically to void arbitration agreements, and not contracts in general, is
preempted by the FAA, even if the purpose of the law may have been to
promote the knowing choice of arbitration. 219 The jury trial argument simply
was not considered by the Court, and it would not be logically inconsistent
for the Court to preempt notice requirements contained in state law while still
requiring courts to look for the knowing, intelligent waiver compelled by the
Seventh Amendment. The Court also would not have to reverse any of its
other decisions, including its holding in Gilmer that claims brought under the
ADEA are not necessarily exempt from binding arbitration, 220 and its
holding in Terminix that state statutes voiding predispute arbitration clauses
are generally preempted by the FAA. 221
Nor, in my view, would application of the Seventh Amendment analysis
clearly be inconsistent with the FAA's statutory language requiring that courts
enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements "save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."222 While some courts
have construed that language to support only common law contractual
defenses such as unconscionability and fraud, there is no reason why the
principles of contract interpretation deriving from the Seventh Amendment
would not be considered to be grounds "at law or in equity." Any contract
calling for waiver of a constitutional right, including a jury trial right, must be
examined to ensure that it is voluntary, knowing and intelligent.
However, if Professor Ware's more narrow interpretation of the FAA
prevails, and courts interpret Section 2 of the FAA to foreclose use of the
standard Seventh Amendment waiver analysis, then he is correct that Section
2 is unconstitutional. Congress does not have the power to make binding
arbitration agreements immune to attack under the Seventh Amendment. 223
law). Ware, Employment, Arbitration and Voluntary Consent supra note 140 at 137
n.275.
219 Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996). The state law in
question had provided that an arbitration clause be "typed in underlined capital letters on
the first page of the contract." MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1993).
220 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
221 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
222 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
223 Some might argue that just as Congress may order certain disputes to be resolved
in administrative agencies, in which jury trials are not available, so too may it order that
courts enforce binding arbitration clauses, even when not agreed to knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently. However, such an argument would be unconvincing, at least
if applied on a widespread basis and not to a limited set of claims. While it is true that the
Court has permitted certain disputes to be resolved by administrative agencies, without
juries, the Court has made clear that only "public" and not "private" rights may be
determined in this fashion. Compare Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473
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2. It is Circular and Illegitimate to State That Because Disputants
Contractually Waived Their Right to Trial, the Seventh
Amendment Test for Waiver Need Not be Applied
Several decisions have been read to support an argument that by waiving
the right to participate in a constitutionally protected forum a person waives
the right to a jury trial or to an Article III hearing, even though the standard
jury trial waiver test may not have been met. On its face, this rationale lacks
plausibility, due to its circularity. Rephrased, the explanation would provide
"We need not determine whether you knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waived your right because you previously waived your right to
have us use that test, even though your prior waiver itself may not have been
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent." This Section will analyze these cases in
detail.
In the leading case of Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission,224 the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's finding that
Geldermann had not "knowingly, intentionally and voluntarily" waived its
U.S. 568, 593-94 (1985) (holding that private right might be so closely intertwined with
public regulatory scheme as to be appropriate for agency resolution), and Atlas Roofing
Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977) (holding
that congressionally created "public" right to occupational health and safety could be
resolved without jury, in administrative agency), with Granfinanciera S.A., v. Nordberg,
492 U.S. 33 (1989) (holding that jury trial was available when bankruptcy trustee sued
party in bankruptcy court over private right); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (holding unconstitutional, under Article III, that portion of
the bankruptcy code which purported to allow a debtor to bring private-law claims, such as
breach of contract suits, against a creditor in a non-Article II court). While the line drawn
in this context between "public" and "private" rights is far from bright, it is clear that the
Court would not permit Congress to eliminate the jury trial by ordering that all claims be
resolved by administrative agencies. Nor would the Court likely permit Congress to shunt
all federal statutory claims to administrative agencies, as it has recognized that some
statutory claims should be considered private in that they closely resemble common law
claims. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. 33, 55-56 (1989) (discussing bankruptcy trustee's right
to recover a fraudulent conveyance). Thus, it seems that Congress cannot, without
violating the Seventh Amendment, empower courts to order binding arbitration of all
claims or even all federal statutory claims, absent the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
waiver of the jury trial right. See generally Stemlight, supra note 40, at 72-76 (discussing
Supreme Court case law distinguishing between which claims can appropriately be
resolved by non-Article tit courts, without juries); Sward, supra note 8, at 1089-1108
(discussing distinction drawn by court between "public" and "private" rights, and arguing
that Court's approach is inconsistent with Seventh Amendment).
224 Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 836 F.2d 310 (7th
Cir. 1987).
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right to an Article M forum and a jury trial,225 instead concluding that
Geldermann had consented to proceed in arbitration, a non-Article III forum,
and thus could not complain about the lack of a jury trial.2 2 6 "In a non-
Article III forum the Seventh Amendment simply does not apply.' 227 Two
subsequent district court decisions in the Seventh Circuit applied this
analysis to conclude that a company's imposition of mandatory arbitration
did not violate an employee's jury trial rights.228 District courts in Texas229
and Mississippi230 employed the same concept to conclude that credit card
holders had waived their right to a jury trial by using their credit cards after
receiving a "change of terms" notice requiring them to submit future disputes
225 Id. at 316.
226 Id. at 316-21. The court also considered, but rejected, the argument that the
purported waiver of Article III rights might be invalid because it impinged on non-
waivable separation of powers interest. Id. at 321-23.
227 Id. at 323. In reaching this conclusion the court drew substantially on Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985), a case in which the Court found
no violation of Article III rights where federal law required pesticide companies to use
binding arbitration to resolve disputes over compensation for shared data submitted to a
federal agency.
228 Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1470-
71 (N.D. 111. 1997) (rejecting plaintiffs Article III and Seventh Amendment claims). As
to the jury trial claim the court stated,
The Seventh Amendment does not confer the right to a trial, but only the right to
have a jury hear the case once it is determined that the litigation should proceed
before a court. If the claims are properly before an arbitral forum pursuant to an
arbitration agreement, the jury trial right vanishes.
Id. at 1471. See also Illyes v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 949 F. Supp. 580, 584 (N.D. Ill.
1996) ("Additionally, because plaintiff has voluntarily consented to arbitration, he has
waived any right he may have had to a full trial before an Article III court. Without a
right to an Article m forum, he has no Seventh Amendment claim.") (citation omitted).
229 Marsh v. First USA Bank, 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 920-21 (N.D. Tex. 2000). The
court explained,
Plaintiffs agreed to submit to arbitration because they assented to the terms of their
Cardmember Agreement. Thus, by agreeing to arbitration they necessarily waived:
(1) their right to a judicial forum, and (2) the concomitant right to a jury trial....
The Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury is necessarily incident to, and
predicated upon the right to a federal judicial forum. Thus, a valid arbitration
provision, which waives the right to resolve a dispute through litigation in a judicial
forum, implicitly waives the attendant right to a jury trial. Therefore, the Seventh
Amendment is not implicated by a contractual provision that precludes access to an
Article III forum.
Id. at 921.
230 Bank One, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 834 (S.D. Miss. 2001) ("If the
claims are properly before an arbitral forum pursuant to an arbitration agreement, the jury
trial right vanishes.").
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to binding arbitration. Courts have also found a waiver of jury trial rights
where parties agreed to submit their disputes to a labor System Board of
Adjustment, 31 to a bankruptcy court,232 or to an Article I Claims Court.233
However, while these decisions set out the sensible principle that a person
may waive the right to a jury trial by agreeing to resolve disputes in a non-jury
setting, on close reading not all of the decisions actually provide that a court
should ignore the normal jury trial standard in determining whether the party
selected a non-jury forum. In fact, one of the "forum selection" decisions,
Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States,234 expressly applies the "voluntary
and knowing" jury trial waiver test.235 It states, "The acceptance of contract
provisions providing for dispute resolution in a forum where there is no
entitlement to a jury trial may satisfy the 'voluntary' and 'knowing'
standard."236
While the other decisions do not expressly apply the "knowing, voluntary
and intelligent" test, only Marsh and Coates come close to stating that the
traditional test is irrelevant to the determination of whether a party has
consented to have disputes resolved in a forum to which the Seventh
231 N.W. Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 373 F.2d 136, 142 (8th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967) ("Here the parties by their contract providing for final
determination of minor disputes by a Systems Board authorized by [45 U.S.C.A.] § 184
waived any constitutional right they might have had to a jury trial.")
23 2 In re Balsam Corp., 185 B.R. 54 (E.D. Mo. 1995). The court explained that "[a]
litigant may also waive its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial by consenting
explicitly or tacitly to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court." Id. at 58. The court
found that the debtor agreed to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court by accepting the
Sales Agreement requiring that disputes would be so resolved. Id. at 58-59.
233 Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(holding that company agreed to relinquish jury trial right by accepting contract calling
for resolution of disputes in Article I claims court).
234 Id.
235 Id. (stating that while litigants may waive their right to a jury trial either
expressly or impliedly, such waiver must be voluntary and knowing based on the facts of
the case).
236 Id. The court went on to conclude that appellants, all "timber companies that
individually contracted with the United States to purchase timber from National Forests,"
did "knowingly and voluntarily" agree. Id. at 1561. While the requirement that disputes
be presented to the Claims Court was presented on a "take it or leave it" basis, the court
explained that fact was not controlling in that "Respondents were not compelled or
coerced into making the contract [with the government]." Id. at 1564-65 (quoting United
States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 100 (1951)). The court also observed that appellants
recognized that the claims court would not provide for ajury trial, absent adoption of new
rules. Given the competence of the parties, the court's conclusion that appellants waived
their jury trial rights is consistent with the line of jury trial waiver cases discussed earlier
in this Article.
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Amendment would not apply.237 The other cases do not clearly discuss the
waiver standard that must be used to uphold an arbitration clause.2 38
Nor is it clear that all of these cases would have come out differently had
the courts explicitly considered whether the decision to resolve disputes in a
non-Article III forum was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. In
Geldermann, for example, the party claiming it was entitled to a jury trial
was, by its own account, "the largest commodity broker in the United
States."239  As a precondition of joining the Chicago Board of Trade this
company agreed to be bound by the rules and regulations of that
organization.240 These rules were subsequently amended to mandate binding
arbitration, and the company was well aware of the change. 241 Moreover, the
company had previously arbitrated a dispute.242 Given these facts, it is not
obvious that the waiver was not "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent" under
the traditional four factor test.243  Similarly, Northwest Airlines, Inc.244
237 Marsh is a rather odd decision in that the court seemingly fails to recognize that
the knowing, voluntary, intelligent standard is traditionally used in contractual jury trial
waivers. Instead, the court purportedly distinguishes all the cases cited by plaintiff,
characterizing them as irrelevant because they involved criminal matters, non-contractual
jury trial waivers, or collective bargaining agreements. Marsh v. First USA Bank, 103 F.
Supp. 2d 909, 921 (N.D. Tex. 2000). Coates states that no "clear and unmistakeable"
waiver must be shown, as would be required if the Seventh Amendment were at issue,
but does not explain what standard must instead be used to determine whether the
individual has selected arbitration over litigation. Bank One v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d
819, 834 (S.D. Miss. 2001).
238 See Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n., 836 F.2d 310
(7th Cir. 1987); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 373 F.2d 136 (8th Cir.
1967); Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Ill.
1997); llyes v. John Nuveen & Co., 949 F. Supp. 580 (N.D. l. 1996); In re Balsam
Corp., 185 B.R. 54 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
239 Geldermann, 836 F.2d at 317.
240 Id. at 317-18.
241 Id. at 318. In fact, there was substantial publicity over the adoption of the
mandatory arbitration rule, which was fought administratively and through litigation by
the CBOT. Id. at 312-15.
242 Id. at 320-21 (calling Geldermann's objection "belated" and "self-serving," and
emphasizing that Geldermann had previously submitted a claim to arbitration and was
content with that forum until it lost).
243 Geldermann's strongest argument is that the participation was mandatory.
However, the court emphasized that Geldermann could have chosen to resign its
membership in the CBOT. Id. at 319 n.9. While this Author might have resolved the
case differently, for this reason, the conclusion is not inconsistent with other courts'
decisions in jury trial waiver cases, given the great wealth and power and sophistication
possessed by Geldermann. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARv. L. REv. 916, 992 n.414 (1988)
(referring to Geldermann and stating "to call this a 'waiver' is to render the concept
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involved the collective bargaining agreement entered into between Northwest
Airlines and the Air Line Pilots Association. It is hard to imagine how
Northwest Airlines could have shown that its decision in this agreement to
submit certain disputes to a non-jury forum was not knowing and
intelligent.24 5 In In re Balsam Corp.,24 6 the party claiming a jury trial was
Southwest Recreational Industries, Inc., a company which agreed to pay
approximately $3.5 million for debtor's assets.247 Again it would be very
hard for such a company to show the type of imbalance of power or
ignorance normally required to invalidate a jury trial waiver.
The four district court cases all reach more questionable results. Both
Cremin and Illyes involved individual employees, rather than large
companies, and both involved arbitration that was imposed on the employee
on a mandatory basis, in a form contract.24 8 In Cremin the employee signed
a Form U-4 in which she agreed to arbitrate all disputes between her and her
firm that were required to be arbitrated under the rules of NASD.249 In Illyes
the employee signed an earlier version of Form U-4 which agreed to comply
with the NASD rules (which called for arbitration), but the Form U-4 itself
did not mention arbitration.25 0 Although both employees were relatively
sophisticated, both clauses are questionable, given the imbalance of power,
the lack of clarity of the waiver (particularly in ilyes), and the non-
negotiability of the waiver. Still, the district courts handling these
employment disputes did not go so far as to conclude that the clauses were
valid although not entered knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently.
The most problematic cases are Marsh,251 and Bank One, N.A. v.
Coates.25 2 Marsh was a putative class action brought by credit card holders
against the issuing bank to contest late fees and other assessments. The
defendant argued that the claims must be arbitrated, in that some of the card
meaningless"); Sternlight, supra note 40, at 33 (critiquing Geldermann's conception of
voluntary).
244 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 373 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1967).
245 Specifically, Northwest Airlines would have a hard time showing lack of
bargaining power or sophistication, or that the collective bargaining agreement was
imposed on it as a contract of adhesion.
246 In re Balsam Corp., 185 B.R. 54 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
247 Id. at 55-56.
248 Illyes v. John Nuveen & Co., 949 F. Supp. 580, 580 (discussing claim brought
by bond analyst against his former employer); Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1460 (examining claim brought by registered securities
representative against her employer).
249 Cremin, 957 F. Supp. at 1462-63.
250 llyes, 949 F. Supp. at 582.
251 Marsh v. First USA Bank, 103 F. Supp. 2d 909 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
252 Bank One, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819 (S.D. Miss. 2001).
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holders' initial Cardmember Agreements required arbitration, 253 and that the
other card holders were required to arbitrate by an amendment to the
Cardmember Agreement subsequently imposed by the company. 254 When
both sets of card holders asserted that requiring them to arbitrate would
deprive them of their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, and that
defendant could not show that they had "clearly and unmistakably" waived
their right,255 the court rejected the argument stating that all the plaintiffs had
waived such rights by "agreeing to arbitration." 256 However, it seems fairly
clear that if the court had applied the "knowing, voluntary, intelligent"
standard it would not have found a valid waiver of the jury trial right.
Although the district court does not provide a great deal of information
regarding how the Cardholders Agreement was imposed, it is typical that
such Agreements are sent to Cardholders at some point after they have
applied for, and perhaps received, the credit card. The arbitration clause is
usually one of many, contained in small print in a lengthy brochure. No
signature or initials are required. No negotiation of the clause is permitted.
Thus, taking into account the non-conspicuousness and non-negotiability of
the clause, as well as the relative lack of sophistication and bargaining power
of the cardholders, the clause would likely fail the Seventh Amendment
test.257 It is very doubtful courts would employ such a presumption when
interpreting a Seventh Amendment jury trial waiver.
In Bank One, the defendant in the federal suit, Clarence Coates, had filed
suit in state court together with thirty-seven others alleging claims relating to
their purchase and financing of a home satellite system.258 Bank One
brought a suit to compel arbitration in federal court against each of the state
court plaintiffs. 259 The original Credit Application and Security Agreement
did not call for arbitration but permitted Bank One to make amendments to
the agreement. 260  Some time later, Bank One sent a notice to its
cardmembers, including Coates, announcing that the agreement terms would
be modified by an arbitration clause.261 Cardholders were not required to
253 See id. at 915.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 920-21.
256 Id. at 921.
257 The card holders who were sent to arbitration by a subsequent amendment of the
Cardholder Agreement have an even stronger claim, in that defendant could not even
prove they had actually received the amendment, without the benefit of a presumption
that clauses which are likely mailed are likely received. Id. at 916-19.
258 Bank One v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 821 (S.D. Miss. 2001).
259 Id.
260 Id. at 25-26.
261 Id. at 826.
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sign any provision but were provided an opportunity to reject the. new terms
if they did so in writing by a certain date.262 When Coates argued, in part,
that the arbitration clause was invalid because Bank One could not
"demonstrate... a clear and unmistakable waiver" of his Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial, the court held the standard was inapplicable.
Quoting Marsh263 the court explained
The Seventh Amendment does not confer the right to a trial, but only the
right to have a jury hear the case once it is determined that the litigation
should proceed before a court. If the claims are properly lefore an arbitral
forum pursuant to an arbitration agreement, the jury trial right vanishes. 264
Yet, as in Marsh, it appears that had the court applied the "knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent" standard to determine whether Coates relinquished
his jury trial in favor of arbitration, it likely would have concluded he did
not. Although the language of the original agreement and the amendment
was purportedly clear, the print in both documents was "small if not 'tiny,"'
the court does not give reason to believe negotiation was permitted, no
signature or initials were required, and although the court provides no
background on Mr. Coates, there was likely a significait imbalance of power
and sophistication.265
The absurdity of the argument that persons waive their Seventh
Amendment rights by "agreeing" to arbitration, even if not knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently, can be further demonstrated by a couple of
thought experiments, one criminal and one civil. As we all know, Miranda v.
Arizona266 interprets the Constitution to require police to read prisoners their
rights before subjecting them to interrogation.2 67 Imagine, however, that the
police take a person into custody, hand the person a multi-page form stating,
among other things, "I knowingly waive all my rights under the U.S.
Constitution," and demand that the person sign the form, stating it is a "mere
formality." Having secured the signature, the police go on to conduct the
interrogation, without having informed the person of the rights to an attorney,
to remain silent, and that anything said might be used against them in court.
Does anyone have a doubt but that the results of this interrogation would be
suppressed?
262 Id.
263 Marsh v. First USA Bank, 103 F. Supp. 2d 909,921 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
24 Id. at 834.
265 Id. at 831-34.
2 66 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 67 Id. at 444-45.
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Similarly, imagine a scenario in which a credit card company sends all
its customers a notice which reads, in fine print, in a paragraph buried in a
document covering other matters, "By continuing to use your credit card you
agree that with respect to all claims arising between you and the Company,
you waive any rights you may have had to present claims arising under the
U.S. Constitution." Could the company then argue that the customer had
waived any right to a jury trial, or to notice and a hearing under the Due
Process clause? Surely such a waiver would only be valid, if at all, if it met
the knowing, voluntary, intentional test for waivers of constitutional rights.
The company could not likely successfully argue that the customer had
waived such rights by agreeing to participate in a non-constitutional
transaction.
One reader of an early draft of this article suggested that the arbitral
waiver of jury trial rights is no less acceptable than the waiver which
inevitably occurs when a plaintiff, perhaps unwittingly, fails to file her claim
within the statute of limitations period. However, this analogy is
problematic. While it is of course true that a person is not entitled to a jury
trial on a clearly inadequate claim,268 the arbitration clause purports to
deprive persons of a jury trial forum for all claims, valid or invalid.
In sum, it makes no sense to say that a contract agreeing to waive a jury
trial, in favor of arbitration or any other non-Article I forum, should be
judged by any standard other than the traditional test for legitimate waiver of
the jury trial right. No court has come up with a plausible rationale for
applying anything but the "knowing, voluntary and intelligent" test to
determine whether the Seventh Amendment right has been waived. Thus, in
those cases brought in federal court in which a jury trial would otherwise
have been available, courts should use the traditional jury trial waiver
standard to determine whether the arbitration clause is valid.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF SEVENTH AMENDMENT FOR BINDING
ARBITRATION
A. Accepting the Relevance of the Seventh Amendment Will Not
Entirely Prohibit Companies from Imposing Binding Arbitration
Some may suggest that applying the Seventh Amendment to arbitration
clauses would be undesirable, from a policy perspective. They may fear that
arbitration would be substantially curtailed, and that parties and the justice
268 See, e.g., Fid. & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-22 (1902)
(holding that District of Columbia's rule allowing for summary disposition of case did not
deprive claimant of jury trial right, where claimant failed to submit affidavit showing
there was a real issue for trial).
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system will be detrimentally impacted. However, such fears are not well
placed. First, as a matter of fact, applying the Seventh Amendment will not
entirely eliminate mandatory binding arbitration. Second, to the extent the
Seventh Amendment does eliminate certain uses of mandatory binding
arbitration, this will be desirable from a policy perspective. The practices
that will be eliminated are those that are most unfair. This section will also
examine implication of the Seventh Amendment for the continued viability
of the Supreme Court's arbitration case law, including Gilmer.
1. The Seventh Amendment Does Not Always Apply
As noted earlier, there are many disputes to which the Seventh
Amendment will not apply. It will only apply to disputes that are brought in
federal court.269 Further, even in federal court it will only apply to those
disputes brought at "common law," in which a jury trial would otherwise
have been available.270 Thus, recogni ing the.applicability of the Seventh
Amendment to consumer and other disputes will not entirely eliminate
mandatory arbitration of those kinds of disputes.271
2. Even When the Seventh Amendment Applies, It Will Permit
theEnforcement of Binding Arbitration Agreements So Long
As All Parties Choose Arbitration "Knowingly, Voluntarily,
and Intentionally"
As Section l's discussion of the jury trial waiver cases shows, applying
the Seventh Amendment to a waiver by no means requires that the waiver will
be invalidated. Courts have been quite willing to uphold jury trial waivers, so
long as they were entered "knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally. '272
Thus, in the arbitration context, companies would not be foreclosed from
entering into arbitration agreements with their consumers and employees, but
would merely have to make sure that the agreements met the Seventh
Amendment criteria. It need not be unduly burdensome for companies to
comply with the Seventh Amendment.273
269 See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
270 See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
271 Of course, if jury trial rights protected under state constitutions and statutes can
be used to invalidate arbitration clauses, see supra note 8, many more arbitration clauses
will be subject to invalidation;
272 See supra text accompanying notes 90-94.
273 See, e.g., Penn v. Ryan's Family Steakhouses, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 940, 951-52
(N.D. Ind. 2000) (pointing out that companies can take steps to make sure that their
727
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What would application of the Seventh Amendment mean to mandatory
arbitration from a practical perspective? The clauses most likely to be
upheld would be those that are conspicuous, signed or initialed, actually
negotiated, entered into between two sophisticated parties, in a situation
where there is no severe power imbalance between the parties. Thus, as in
litigation, it can be expected that courts would typically uphold clauses that
are part of commercial transactions between two relatively sophisticated
parties. It can also be anticipated that courts would uphold clauses actually
negotiated between high level employees and their employer, particularly
where such high level employees were represented by counsel.
In contrast, the clauses most likely to be voided would be those imposed
on unsophisticated consumers or employees, particularly where the clause
was merely contained in an envelope stuffer, employee handbook, or
warranty booklet, that did not even require a signature or initialing.274
Courts would also be more likely to void those clauses that were relatively
inconspicuous, that were imposed on persons who lacked a real opportunity
to negotiate, or that were accompanied by misleading verbal explanations.
Does this mean that companies could never use contracts of adhesion to
enter pre-dispute arbitration agreements with consumers and employees who
would otherwise have had a jury trial in claims at common law brought in
federal court? It will likely depend on the specific circumstances under
which the arbitration clause is introduced. The "in between" cases would be
left to the discretion of the courts, as they currently are in the contractual jury
waiver context. For example, courts would likely split on whether they
should approve or disapprove a clear but not particularly conspicuous
binding arbitration clause imposed on a relatively sophisticated consumer or
employee in a contract of adhesion that required a signature. Some judges
would see such a clause as knowing and voluntary, and others would not.
While some might protest such a result as unduly arbitrary and uncertain, it is
employees actually understand the meaning of the arbitration clause that they are asked to
sign, and that doing so "need not be unduly burdensome").
274 Precisely such a distinction was drawn by the Connecticut Superior Court in
Norton v. Commercial Credit Corp., No. CV 98-0578441-S, 1998 WL 729700 (Conn.
Super. Oct. 6, 1998). That court refused to enforce an arbitration clause contained in a
company employment handbook, where the employee earned just $10 per hour, where
the arbitration clause did not clearly state that it constituted a jury trial waiver, where the
employee was not represented by counsel and had no chance to negotiate, and where the
district manager informed her that her signature was merely an acknowledgment of
receipt of the documents. The court distinguished L & R Realty v. Connecticut Nat'l
Bank, 715 A.2d 748 (Conn. 1998), in which the Connecticut Supreme Court held that
jury trial waivers contained in commercial contracts were prima facie evidence of
intentional waiver, on the ground that commercial and non-commercial contracts are
different. Norton, 1998 WL 729700, at *4.
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precisely the approach already being, taken with contractual jury trial
waivers. •It is consistent with the Supreme Court's recognition that the
viability of waivers is often highly fact specific.275  I
Applying the jury trial waiver analysis would also accomplish several other
changes. First, at least in disputes covered by the Seventh Amendment courts
would cease using the "arbitration is favored"! verbiage to interpret arbitration
clauses more broadly than may have been intended by the parties, or to
eliminate potential defenses.276 Instead, they would be sure not to infer lightly
the existence of an arbitration clause, where the arbitration clause would
impinge on a Seventh Amendment right.277 Second, and relatedly, where the
coverage of an arbitration clause is ambiguous courts would interpret the clause
narrowly, rather than broadly.2 78 Third, in many jurisdictions, courts -would
require proponents rather than opponents of an arbitration clause to carry, the
burden of showing that the clause was entered, knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently.279
In sum, applying the Seventh Amendment would still permit persons
who prefer arbitration to litigation to elect that option, knowingly and
voluntarily, but would prohibit companies from using arbitration to take
advantage of unknowing consumers, employees, or other "little guys." This
result is desirable, from a policy perspective.280
B. Requiring that Arbitration Be Elected "Knowingly, Voluntarily, and
Intentionally" Is Consistent with the OriginalPolicy Underlying
Passage of the Federal Arbitration Act
As I have argued elsewhere, the Federal Arbitration Act *was never
intended to permit companies to impose arbitration on unkn6wing consumers
and employees, but rather was merely intended to allow two sophisticated
275 See, e.g., D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 188 (1972) ("[O]ur
holding, of course, is not controlling precedent for other facts of other cases."); Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (stating waiver of right to counsel- depends on
analysis of specific facts and circumstances). -
276 See supra text accompanying notes 131-39.
277 See supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
278 Compare supra text accompanying notes 102-08, with supra text accompanying
notes 186-87.
279 Compare supra text accompanying notes 99-101; with supra text accompanying
notes 182-85.
280 See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 56-58 (urging courts to cease enforcing arbitral
contracts of adhesion); Jean R. Stemlight, Compelling Arbitration of Claims Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1866: What Congress Could Not Have Intended, 47 U. KAN. L. REv.
273, 310-13 (1999); Stemlight, supra note 132, at 647.
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businesses to enter into pre-dispute arbitration agreements. 281 The legislative
history of the Act is filled with discussions of how businesses need to be able
to enter into enforceable arbitration agreements with one another.282 In
contrast, while companies in 1924 did not customarily seek to impose
contracts of adhesion on a widespread basis, the FAA's legislative history
does reflect legislators' concern that arbitration not be imposed through non-
negotiable contracts of adhesion in the employment or insurance context.283
Thus, applying the Seventh Amendment to arbitration would not undercut the
policy underlying the FAA, but would instead support it.
C. Recognizing the Relevance of the Seventh Amendment in Some Cases
Would Not Require Reversal of the Holding of any Extant Supreme
Court Precedents
As the Court has never considered the relevance of the Seventh
Amendment to arbitration, it has never held that arbitration clauses are for
any reason exempt from its coverage. Gilmer held that parties could agree
to arbitrate ADEA claims, and found that a particular registered securities
representative had so agreed.284 However, Gilmer did not examine whether
the Seventh Amendment required the agreement to be knowing, voluntary
and intelligent. Casarotto held that a Montana statute providing that
arbitration clauses be presented in a particular conspicuous fashion was
preempted by the FAA, and thus found that a franchisee could be compelled
to arbitrate under a clause that did not comply with the statutory
requirement.285  However, Casarotto, a case brought in state court, 286
understandably did not consider whether the Seventh Amendment might
require conspicuousness in certain cases. Similarly, although Terminix 287
found that consumers could be compelled to arbitrate, based on an adhesive
contract, in that the state statute prohibiting pre-dispute arbitration clauses
281 See Sternlight, supra note 132, at 647. See also Harding supra note 215; Stone,
supra note 215.
282 Sternlight, supra note 280, at 311.
283 See Sternlight, supra note 280, at 311-13. See also Allstar Homes, Inc. v.
Waters, 711 So. 2d 924, 930-32 (Cook, J. concurring) (reviewing legislative history of
FAA and asserting that it illustrates that arbitration was not intended to allow the
elimination of jury trials through involuntary or adhesive contracts). Nor did Circuit City
address this issue when it held that the FAA's employment exclusion should be
interpreted narrowly. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001).
284 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
285 Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1996).
286 Id.
287 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
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was preempted by the FAA, again the Court did not consider whether the
customers had a protected jury trial right. As in Casarotto, the Seventh
Amendment likely would have been found inapplicable had the Court
considered it in Terminix, in that the original action was brought in state
court. 288 Thus, while some lower courts and commentators have interpreted
the Supreme Court's arbitration decisions to be a ringing endorsement of
mandatory arbitration, even absent a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
agreement to arbitrate, in fact the issue has never been addressed.
D. How Would the Gilmer Case Have Come Out if the Court Had
Applied a Seventh Amendment Analysis?
It is illustrative to consider what would have happened if the courts had
applied a jury trial waiver analysis in the Gilmer case itself. The first
question that would have had to have been addressed was whether or not Mr.
Gilmer was bringing a claim at "common law" that was protected under the
Seventh Amendment. At the time Gilmer was decided it was unclear
whether claims under the ADEA gave rise to a Seventh Amendment jury trial
right. Although the Supreme Court had decided that a statutory jury trial
right did exist under the ADEA,289 such a statutory right is not necessarily
governed by the constitutional standards set forth above, and the Court did
not reach the Seventh Amendment issue.290
It is certainly possible courts might have concluded that claims under the
ADEA gave rise to a Seventh Amendment jury trial right. While the ADEA
did not exist, at common law, a court might well have concluded that because
the type of relief afforded by the statute was "legal," the action was
sufficiently similar to a common law claim that it should entitle parties to a
jury trial.291
Assuming Mr. Gilmer had a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, did
he waive it knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently? First, examining the
negotiability of the clause, the Court recognized that Gilmer was required to
register as a securities representative with several stock exchanges, and that
these applications included an agreement to arbitrate all disputes required to
288 Id at 268-69.
289 Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577, 585 (1978) (holding that that there was a
statutory right to a jury trial under the ADEA, even prior to addition of explicit right in
§626(c), but failing to address whether the Seventh Amendment would also require that a
jury trial be available for claims brought under the ADEA).
290 Id. at 577.
291 See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
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be arbitrated by the rules of the various exchanges. 292  It seems this
application was neither negotiated nor subject to negotiation.
Second; with regard to conspicuousness and disparity of bargaining
power, while the Supreme Court opinion does not provide a great deal of
detail, it reveals a few facts that could be used to challenge the waiver. The
decision does reveal that Mr. Gilmer was not provided with clear information
regarding the scope of the arbitration clause. His registration application
stated that he agreed to resolve those disputes "required to be arbitrated under
the rules, constitutions or by-laws of the organizations with which I
register."293 The Court did not state, however, that Mr. Gilmer was actually
provided with a copy of the New York Stock Exchange Rule providing for
arbitration of "[a]ny controversy between a registered representative and any
member or member organization arising out of the employment of such
registered representative." (alteration in original)294 Thus, it appears the
complete provision was far from conspicuous. Regarding disparity of
bargaining power, the Court makes no finding, but it does not reject Mr.
Gilmer's claim that there was a disparity of bargaining power between
employer and employee. 295
One factor supports upholding the waiver. In terms of business and
professional experience, the Court finds that Mr. Gilmer was "an experienced
businessman. "296
Thus, although the last factor supports waiver, most of the factors lead to
a conclusion that Mr. Gilmer did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
waive his jury trial rights. Particularly in those jurisdictions that place the
burden of proof on the party supporting waiver, it is likely that if Mr. Gilmer
could have established a Seventh Amendment jury trial right, he could have
defeated the arbitration clause. In short, although the holding of Gilmer
would continue to stand, a new case with identical facts to Gilmer might
come out differently under a Seventh Amendment analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial has been a fundamental part
of our Constitution since 1791. Although the right is waivable, such waivers
must be genuine; specifically, they must be knowing, voluntary, and
292 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Id. at 33. Instead, the Court states: "Mere inequality in bargaining power,
however, is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never
enforceable in the employment context." Id. at 33.
296 Id. at 33.
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intelligent. Companies cannot legitimately evade this strict constitutional
requirement by using arbitration clauses. Instead, when- an arbitration clause
is being used to deny persons the Seventh Amendment jury trial-right they
otherwise would have had, it is unconstitutional for courts to enforce such a
clause. -
Some may protest this result, asserting that binding arbitration is a better
mode of dispute resolution than is the jury trial, and that it is more desirable
and cheaper for all concerned. While I remain unconvinced that this is
true,297 it is also fundamentally irrelevant. Whatever the arguable benefits of
binding arbitration over litigation, our Constitution states that jury trials are
to be preferred over arbitration.
Thus, those persons who would rather resolve their disputes through
binding arbitration, than by jury trial, haye iwo simple choices when the
disputes are covered by the Seventh Amendment. First, they may secure
their opponents' knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of the jury trial
right. Alternatively, they may secure an amendment to-the U.S. Constitution
that limits the scope of the Seventh Amendment. Absent such an
amendment, neither private companies nor any court can legitimately use
binding arbitration to obliterate the Seventh Amendment.2 98
297 Stemlight, supra note 132, at 674-97. In those circumstances where binding
arbitration is truly better and cheaper for all it can be agreed to, knowingly and
voluntarily. Mandatory arbitration is not needed. -
298 Professor Ellen Sward makes a similar argument to mine, in a related context.
Discussing the increasing use of legislative courts, which do not provide for juries, Sward
suggests that such courts are often violative of the Seventh Amendment. See Sward,
supra note 8. In her conclusion, she states the following:
I am well aware that many members of the legal profession do not have a favorable
opinion of the jury and that the arguments I have made here will seem like heresy to
them. I am concerned, however, that the right to a jury trial is eroding before our
eyes and that we seem neither to recognize it nor to care .... Neither neglect nor
habit should be permitted to serve as a convenient rationalization for the
deterioration of a fundamental constitutional right.
Id. at 1142. Sward also points out that "[w]hile efficiency and expertise are the values
that Congress seeks to effectuate by creating legislative courts, those values are irrelevant
if legislative courts are unconstitutional." Id. at 1062-63. The parallels .are clear. See
also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, at 198 (1974) (holding that policy arguments
suggesting that jury trials may bring delay or risk prejudice "are insufficient to overcome
the clear command of the Seventh Amendment").
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